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The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy
Diane Lourdes Dick *
ABSTRACT

This Article challenges the persistent claim that Chapter 11’s increasing
utilization of market mechanisms will help facilitate economically efficient
resolutions of corporate financial distress. Using two recent case studies, I show
that, in fact, these mechanisms are used by stakeholders with existing market
power to take control of the restructuring process and extract rents at the
expense of other constituents: creditors, equity holders, and—in the case of
companies that receive governmental bailouts—taxpayers. These distortionary
effects are obscured by a dominant, neoclassical legal paradigm that ignores
institutional and political dynamics. I advance a new explanatory model that
draws upon modern social science to capture these otherwise-unexplored forces.
This new model offers a template for law reform efforts aimed at improving
market equality and allocating resources in commercial restructurings more
rationally, contributing to an overall increase in social welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Great Recession, many U.S. companies
defaulted on their loans, necessitating the restructuring of
substantial corporate debt via Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 1 Frustrated by
the outcomes of some recent high-profile cases, 2 many observers
think that the prevailing legal process for restructuring bankrupt
companies is broken and that Chapter 11 ought to be overhauled. 3
To this end, the American Bankruptcy Institute recently convened
the Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, laying the
groundwork for a comprehensive rewriting of Chapter 11. 4
Almost all critics of the extant legal construct cite the need for a
more efficient and equitable commercial bankruptcy process. 5 But
they disagree as to how the existing framework ought to be changed.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012) (providing for reorganizations of bankrupt persons).
Corporate bankruptcies nearly doubled in the wake of the financial crisis. In 2010, more than
90,000 U.S. companies filed for bankruptcy, compared to 46,199 companies in 2007. Eric
Morath, Business Bankruptcies Fell 18% in May But Trend Might Not Hold, WALL ST. J. (June 10,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304259304576377881790360422.
2. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain on GM, Delphi, and Hostess,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Nov.
29,
2012,
1:43
PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/11/29/bankruptcy-judge-robert-drain-on-gm-delphi-andhostess/.
3. Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Leaders Call for Chapter 11 Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/04/19/bankruptcy-leaders-call-for-chapter-11-overhaul/.
4. Id.
5. See id.; see also Robert Keach & Albert Togut, Catching Up on Chapter 11 Reform, ABL
ADVISOR (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.abladvisor.com/articles/1652/catching-up-onchapter-11-reform-abi-commission-enters-second-year.
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Many industry leaders celebrate Chapter 11’s increasing engagement
of market mechanisms, and argue that modern reform efforts should
focus on further reducing judicial and statutory interference with the
market’s own verdict. 6 To be sure, this is not a novel view as there is
a rich academic tradition of recommending market-based reforms to
Chapter 11. 7 Proposals of this sort are largely in reaction to the
drafters’ early optimistic view that party consensus—as opposed to
judicial edict—would yield efficient restructuring outcomes in
Chapter 11 cases. 8 Over time, observers leveled the damning critique
that, in practice, certain self-interested stakeholders controlled
negotiations and crowded out dissent. 9 To avoid these problems,
critics urged greater integration of market mechanisms—such as the
sale of the debtor’s assets prior to confirmation of a plan—to
apportion rights in Chapter 11. 10
But not all observers believe that the market can check the
natural tendencies of powerful parties to take control of the
restructuring process. Some critics call for closer judicial monitoring
of Chapter 11 negotiations, as well as statutory limitations on the
use of market-based processes to allocate rights and obligations in

6. Allison Bisbey, Leveraged Lenders Gear Up for Chapter 11 Reform Fight, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_222/leveraged-lenders-gear-upfor-chapter-11-reform-fight-1054439-1.html.
7. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775 (1998) (proposing a bankruptcy process by which equity security holders and
unsecured creditors receive options to purchase shares in the reorganized debtor); David Skeel
& Robert Rasmussen, The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 85, 85–115 (1995) (exploring market-based processes in corporate bankruptcy
restructurings); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform,
8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992) (proposing a two-stage, market-based process for identifying
residual claims in commercial bankruptcy and choosing a reorganization plan); Douglas G. Baird,
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 145 (1986) (proposing the
sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern as an alternative to Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
Arguments in favor of market-based reforms have also been made in other areas of corporate
law. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (2008)
(arguing that market-driven protections, rather than regulatory oversight, provide a more
reliable form of corporate governance).
8. This history is explored in Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A

Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization
Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995).
9. Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 210 (2012)
(summarizing early criticisms of Chapter 11).
10. See generally Douglas Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and
Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (Inst. for Law and Econ., Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working
Paper No. 43, 1997), available at www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/43.Baird_.Chapter11.pdf.
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commercial restructurings. 11 Concerns of this sort reflect a longstanding belief that the bankruptcy process also serves a protective
function, ensuring that absolute priority is respected. 12 At the same
time, they echo an emergent view that restructurings of large
companies are highly political and distributional processes that have
the potential to generate wide-spanning social welfare burdens. 13
Indeed, as we’ve known for some time, financially troubled
commercial debtors are often forced to make extreme concessions to
avoid liquidation, 14 while their equity holders and creditors typically
sustain sizable losses. Recent large-scale bankruptcies also
demonstrate that other more diffuse burdens arise by way of job
losses, 15 fire-sale externalities, 16 and, in some extreme cases,
governmental bail-outs. 17 Thus, to the extent market mechanisms
fail to achieve a fair and efficient allocation, there can be substantial
ripple effects.
At the center of the modern reform debate are two fundamental
questions: How is Chapter 11 bankruptcy used by stakeholders of
distressed firms to advance their economic interests, and do market
mechanisms foster more efficient and equitable restructurings?
Implicitly, these questions require us to revisit the early criticisms
11. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (2013) (arguing in favor of a limited right for secured creditors to
engage in credit bidding); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174 (2012)
(arguing that recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code reduce judicial discretion and
empower certain creditors to force the debtor to liquidate).
12. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker & Charles Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling
Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 60 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1379, 1391 (2010) (referring to Chapter 11 as
a system based upon “distributional norms,” and considering how political forces in recent
automotive bankruptcies threatened these norms).
13. This viewpoint is only recently emerging. Professor Adam Levitin explains:
“Bankruptcy is ultimately a distributional exercise . . . and [that] makes it inherently political.
The shape of bankruptcy law is an expression of distributional norms . . . and interest group
politics, rather than an exercise in economic efficiency.” Adam Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the
Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2012).
14. See Adler, supra note 9, at 210–11.
15. Matthew Leising & Shannon D. Harrington, MF Global Workers Learn of Firing From
Media, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2011, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1111/some-mf-global-workers-said-to-learn-of-firing-from-news-reports.html (reporting job losses
following MF Global’s bankruptcy).
16. Fire sale externalities occur when market disruptions force owners to sell assets to
low valuation users. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and
Macroeconomics, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (2011).
17. See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568 (2011)
(exploring financial institution bailouts).
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leveled against Chapter 11 and better understand how the legal
construct might allow powerful stakeholders to trample the rights of
others; only then can we appreciate the role of market mechanisms
in this same system. The answers to these questions have the
potential to generate legal reforms that completely reshape
commercial bankruptcy law. And so it is that these hard times, and
their attendant legal controversies, provide an opportunity to study
forces that were overlooked in better days. As political economist
Peter Gourevitch explains in his work on financial crises, “[h]ard
times expose strengths and weaknesses to scrutiny, allowing
observers to see relationships that are often blurred in prosperous
periods, when good times slake the propensity to contest and
challenge.” 18
This Article uses a social science theoretical lens to tackle these
questions and to expose the continued entrenchment of what I call
the “Efficiency Fallacy”—a flawed assumption that negotiations
naturally lead to efficient restructuring outcomes. I argue that the
Efficiency Fallacy is a byproduct of Chapter 11’s reliance on an
antiquated economic model. 19 While modern corporate and
bankruptcy law scholars have come to appreciate the complexity of
the large, organizational actors who engage in restructurings, 20

18. PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES 9 (1986).
19. See infra Part II. The influence of neoclassical economic theory on American law is
explored in RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 6 (2001) (crediting economic
analysis of law to economist Ronald Coase); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1986) (asserting that law is deeply influenced by efficiency goals).
20. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2013) (exploring debtor-side complexities, such
as internal corporate governance and other structural factors, on debt restructurings); Sarah Pei
Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011)
(exploring creditor-side complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the regulatory pressures
that drive bank creditors to favor liquidation rather than reorganization); Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 (2010) (exploring creditor-side
complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the fracturing of creditors as a result of rampant
claims trading); Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of
Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69 (2008) (exploring creditor-side complexities
in Chapter 11 reorganizations, including the increasing control asserted by distressed debt
investors); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795
(2004) (exploring creditor-side complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the unique interests
of secured lenders); Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty à la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective
on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53 (1996) (analyzing the
influence of fiduciary duty laws on a firm’s ordering of economic interests).
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Chapter 11 continues to portray these parties as unitary and rational
actors, motivated by clear and deliberate goals. While all models are
necessarily reductive, this assumption persists even where the
debtor is steered by deeply divided or self-interested stakeholders,
and even where there are conflicting factions of creditors jockeying
for control. 21
Meanwhile, social scientists have moved considerably beyond the
early neoclassical economic model of decision-making, 22 thanks to a
growing body of literature in the fields of political economy, 23
behavioral decision theory, 24 organizational theory, 25 and public
choice economics. 26 Following decades of scholarship challenging
the rational, unitary actor construct, 27 modern social scientists

21. See, e.g., Kelsey Butler, Dynegy Deal Involving More Than $2.5B in Claims Ok’d, DEAL
PIPELINE (June 6, 2012, 11:53 AM) (describing a settlement between an organizational debtor
and its unsecured creditors, each of which is portrayed as a unitary actor); Mia Lamar &
Jacqueline Palank, Friendly’s Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011 (describing a
corporate debt restructuring solely with reference to the borrower and its dominant creditors,
each of which is portrayed as a unitary actor).
22. See infra Part III.
23. For a description of political economy as an analytical approach, see infra Part III.A.
24. Behavioral decision theory focuses on individual decision-making in the face of
uncertainty. Classics include: B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORALISM (1974) (advancing a scientific
method of studying human behavior); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of
Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1978) (advancing a theory of “bounded rationality”). More recent
works include MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (2009)
(examining cognitive biases in managerial decision-making).
25. Organizational theory examines how individual decisions translate into organizational
behavior. Since the late 1960s, organizational theory has been dominated by the systems
approach, which “views an organization as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and
interconnected elements . . . and the environment in which it operates and with which it
continuously interacts.” JAY M. SHAFRITZ & J. STEVEN OTT, CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY
263 (1992). As a result, the field has moved beyond the traditional, one-dimensional model of
organizations. Id. at 264. Major works that contributed to these advancements include: ROBERT
KATZ & DANIEL KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1966) (exploring
organizational structure, the individual, and the environment); PAUL R. LAWRENCE & JAY W.
LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT (1967) (analyzing organizational structure and
exogenous market influences); JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967)
(analyzing the interactions of environmental uncertainties and organizational structure);
Fremont E. Kast & James E. Rosenzweig, General Systems Theory: Applications for Organization and
Management, 15 ACAD. MGMT. J. 447 (1972) (exploring applications of systems theory in
organizational management).
26. On public choice theory as a tool for analyzing law, see MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009); see also DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003) (providing an overview of the field).
27. See, e.g., GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 10–14 (1971) (analyzing the decisions of nations through organizational theory, asserting
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recognize that institutional dynamics are a key driver of decisional
outcomes. 28 Drawing upon such literature, this Article advances a
new explanatory model of commercial restructurings that highlights
institutional and political dynamics. I apply this model to two recent
case studies involving distressed commercial debtors in Chapter 11.
The case studies demonstrate how institutional and political
dynamics introduce market imperfections, such as self-dealing,
conflicts of interest, opportunism, information asymmetries, and
collective action obstacles that bolster the bargaining power of some
stakeholders while limiting the influence of others.
A number of powerful insights emerge. Most provocatively, I
argue that, notwithstanding the modern tendency to rely on marketbased processes to apportion rights, Chapter 11 remains ill-equipped
to facilitate efficient or equitable resolutions of corporate financial
distress. Absent deeper structural reform, the overlay of Chapter 11
with market mechanisms continues to enable those with existing
market power in the securities and capital markets to control the
restructuring process and extract rents at the expense of other
constituents. By enhancing market inequalities and enabling the
exercise of market power, Chapter 11 causes a misallocation of
resources and contributes to an overall reduction in social welfare.
Most notably, the distressed firm’s scarce resources are redistributed
as excess returns to parties in a position to exploit these weaknesses
in the legal construct. Modern reformers must be sensitive to these
consequences and integrate suitable checks and balances on marketbased mechanisms. Otherwise, Chapter 11 will continue to suffer
the problems that early critics identified. 29
This Article is organized as follows. Part II considers the
influence of early neoclassical economic analysis of law in shaping
Chapter 11. In an effort to develop a new explanatory model rooted
in a more robust theoretical framework, Part III draws upon
that the rational actor construct is overly simplistic); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963) (studying firms through a behavioralist lens, arguing
that the firm is a coalition of individuals rather than a unified actor with consistent goals).
28. Recent works include ANDREW MACINTYRE, THE POWER OF INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL
ARCHITECTURE AND GOVERNANCE (2003) (analyzing the effect of institutions on governmental
responses to crises).
29. These criticisms echo early complaints raised with respect to Chapter 11’s
predecessor law. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937).

765

DO NOT DELETE

2/6/2014 1:43 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

literature from the fields of political economy, behavioral decision
theory, organizational theory, and public choice economics. Part IV
utilizes two recent case studies to demonstrate the ways in which
modern restructurings depart from relatively thinner conceptions of
neoclassical economics. Part IV also leverages an emerging
understanding of distressed debt negotiations to ask whether—and
how—Chapter 11 should be reformed. Part V concludes.
II. EXPOSING THE EFFICIENCY FALLACY
The modern approach to commercial bankruptcy reorganization
in the U.S. is built upon a theoretical assumption (what I call the
“Efficiency Fallacy”) that compromise and negotiation in Chapter 11
naturally lead to efficient restructuring outcomes. From its inception
as the modern statutory framework for commercial bankruptcy
reorganizations, Chapter 11 has largely relied upon party consensus
rather than judicial edict. Parties are encouraged to settle related
claims as soon as possible 30 and agree to a Chapter 11 plan;
meanwhile, judges are given relatively little discretion over
restructuring outcomes. 31
The Efficiency Fallacy gained momentum in the course of
Chapter 11’s initial adoption in 1978. 32 At that time, neoclassical

30. As the influential U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently noted,
there is a “strong public policy in bankruptcy cases to encourage settlement.” In re Washington
Mut., No. 08–12229, 2012 WL 1563880, at *19 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012). This interest is
reflected in FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (granting the authority to approve settlements or refer
parties to binding arbitration). Additionally, courts, including the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware, have created specialized mediation procedures or court-annexed mediation
programs, through which parties are ordered to attempt resolution of disputes pertaining to a
bankruptcy case. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (1998);
General Order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware dated April 7, 2004
(Walrath, C.J.) (mandating that parties attempt mediation of claims to avoid preferential
transfers); General Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware dated July 23,
2004 (Robinson, C.J.) (mandating that parties attempt mediation of bankruptcy appeals).
31. Ordinarily, a Chapter 11 plan must be confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court unless it
fails to meet certain requirements. See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a) (2012). Moreover, recent
amendments substantially reduced the role of judges in bankruptcy cases. See Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); see also Bruce,
supra note 11 (thoroughly analyzing the impact of the revisions on judicial discretion).
32. Prior to the adoption of Chapter 11 in 1978, business reorganizations were completed
under chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act in
1938. See Don J. Miner, Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis
of Chapter 11, 1979 BYU L. REV. 961, 965–68 (1979).
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economic analysis of law was gaining ground, 33 with scholars
increasingly using price theory and the rational actor model to assess
the economic efficiency of legal constructs. For instance, Professor
Mark Roe, in a 1983 article assessing commercial restructuring via
Chapter 11, summarized the goal of bankruptcy thusly: “The judicial
solution [via the bankruptcy process] . . . mimics the market,
attempting to reach an idealized value of the bankrupt that the court
believes would arise if a perfect market were at work.” 34 In response
to a proliferation of scholarly works debating the efficiency of
Chapter 11,35 Frank Easterbrook concluded, 36 and the balance of the
scholarly community seemed to agree, 37 that bankruptcy was an
efficient rather than wealth transferring process. In Easterbrook’s
view, this was true precisely because Chapter 11 relied on party
consensus rather than judicial resolve. 38 The Supreme Court echoed
Easterbrook’s conclusions: “Chapter 11 . . . relies on creditors and

33. Neoclassical economic theory can be traced to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who
analyzed markets from the perspective of individual actors. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817). Subsequent theorists offered a number of
refinements, and neoclassical economics flourished. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS (1871) (advancing a subjectivist and marginalist view of economic decision-making).
Most recently, neoclassical thought was given renewed vigor by economist Milton Friedman and
others in the “Chicago School.” See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
34. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 530 (1983).
35. David T. Brown, Shareholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy
Law, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 109 (1989) (asserting that bankruptcy reduces holdout problems by
forcing compromise); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
173, 183 (1987) (contemplating a world without bankruptcy law, finding that “the dynamics of
private bargaining that would exist in a world without bankruptcy would make everyone worse
off” due to inefficiencies inherent in the negotiation process); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–11 (1986) (arguing that bankruptcy provides mechanisms for
overcoming inefficiencies inherent in the process by which creditors would otherwise assert
their rights against the debtor).
36. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 413–14
(1990).
37. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998)
(describing the dominant camps among bankruptcy theorists, both of which are ultimately
rooted in efficiency arguments); Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, Asset Efficiency and
Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms, 53 J. FIN. 1495 (1998) (testing the efficiency of
bankruptcy process in allocating productive resources); Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as
a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 268 (1994) (acknowledging that the primary normative goal of corporate bankruptcy is to
liquidate inefficient firms via Chapter 7 and reorganize efficient firms via Chapter 11).
38. Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 414–15.
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equity holders to engage in negotiations toward resolution of their
interests,” because “creditors and equity security holders are very
often better judges of the debtor’s economic viability and their own
economic self-interest than courts.” 39
Decades later, Chapter 11 continues to reflect neoclassical
economic analysis of law, including more modern articulations of
price theory and the efficient market hypothesis. 40 The model asserts
that persons engage in negotiations as rational actors who make
decisions intended to advance self-interest. 41 Thus, parties to
Chapter 11 cases are believed to seek a positive (or the least
negative) 42 return on their investments. 43 To the extent parties
bargain to advance their self-interest in a competitive exchange, the
outcome will reflect an ideal, equilibrium price pursuant to which
the debtor’s assets will be distributed to the highest-value users. In
other words, when firms successfully reorganize in Chapter 11, the
debtor must have enjoyed greater value as a going concern. 44 In
contrast, firms that fail to reach a plan of reorganization and are

39. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457
n.28 (1999).
40. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 94–115 (1995) (describing these modern
theories).
41. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 55 (1988)
(explaining that market participants strive to maximize utility).
42. Courts assume rational actors seek to “cut their losses.” See Bankr. Serv., Inc. v. Ernst
& Young, 529 F.3d 432, 453 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Even the ‘benefit’ provided by ‘further
indebtedness’—capital—‘may provide an illusory financial cushion that lulls shareholders into
postponing the decision to dissolve the corporation’ and thus ‘miss an opportunity to cut their
losses.” (quoting Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))).
43. Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a Financial Incentive for Creditors to
Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(E) and Section 105(A) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2009) (“[C]reditors have a desire to maximize the distribution they
receive on account of their claims.”); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of
Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 422 (2007) (“In all cases we assume that creditors are
motivated to take all available steps to maximize their recoveries in bankruptcy, at least when
those steps have a positive net value.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt
and the Missing Lever of Corporate Finance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1245–46 (2006) (“Private
lenders . . . act to maximize their rate of return.”).
44. David Smith & Per Stromberg, Maximizing the Value of Distressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law
and the Efficiency Reorganization of Firms, SYSTEMIC FIN. CRISES 232–75 (2005); see also United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“[A] troubled enterprise may be
restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future . . . . Congress presumed that the
assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for
scrap.’”).
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instead forced to liquidate must have suffered the harsh
determination of a competitive market that the debtor’s assets are
worth more in an alternative use.45
However, while its underlying economic theory has remained
relatively consistent, commercial bankruptcy process has evolved
considerably in the last thirty-five years. Largely in response to
criticisms that Chapter 11 allows self-interested stakeholders to
crowd out dissent and trample creditors’ state law rights,
commercial bankruptcies increasingly utilize market mechanisms.
For instance, modern Chapter 11 cases are more likely to include
sales of all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets prior to
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, 46 as well as credit-bidding by
secured creditors. 47 Meanwhile, a vigorous bankruptcy claims
trading market has evolved, allowing stakeholders to buy and sell
claims against the debtor. 48 Working together, these mechanisms
are believed to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of its highest-valuing stakeholders, while providing efficient
exit for those who prefer to liquidate their investment. 49 More
broadly, they are believed to complement Chapter 11 by providing
value-enhancing alternatives to negotiated party consensus, thereby
boosting the odds that the most efficient outcome will prevail. The
allure of this logic, and the confidence that the market neatly
vindicates restructuring outcomes, is captured in a Seventh Circuit
opinion: “The judgment of the market vindicates Bank. If more credit
would have enabled Debtor to flourish, then other lenders should

45. See, e.g., In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that one
purpose of bankruptcy is to “convert the bankrupt’s estate into cash and distribute it among
creditors.”); see also Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050–51 (1992) (exploring how courts determine whether a corporate
debtor should be liquidated or permitted to reorganize).
46. Such sales are permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b); see also Matthew Bruckner,

Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction Standard on Objections
to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing in favor of a more streamlined process
for 363 sales to achieve more efficient, market-based outcomes in Chapter 11 cases).
47. Credit-bidding is expressly permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed the right of secured creditors to credit bid in RadLAX Gateway Hotel v.
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). The practice is considered in more detail in Tabb,
supra note 11.
48. The claims trading market is given recent attention in Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy
Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 67 (2009).
49. See supra notes 46 through 48 and sources cited therein.
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have been willing to supply it.” 50 However, as the following section
explores, this logic begins to break down once we consider how
Chapter 11’s inherent economic distortions impair the ability of
market-based processes to fairly and efficiently apportion rights
among constituents in complex commercial bankruptcies.

A. The Fallacy’s Methodological and Theoretical Assumptions
As a legal construct that strives to facilitate consensus, Chapter
11 essentially provides the backdrop against which parties negotiate.
But economic theory counsels that negotiations cannot be relied
upon to yield efficient outcomes unless they take place in a
competitive environment. What is more, the assessment of any
particular outcome as efficient is a matter of perspective. Thus,
where negotiations take place within Chapter 11, the law can impair
competition and introduce a distortionary effect to the extent it
privileges or constrains participation in negotiations.
Of course, any legal construct grants structural privileges. As the
Supreme Court explained, “Our adversary system is designed around
the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are
responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to
relief.” 51 In this way, American law tends to “rely on the parties to
frame the issues for decision.” 52 As a result, only those who are
designated by the legal construct as “parties” are afforded the
privilege of framing legal disputes.
Who ought to be the “parties” to Chapter 11 cases? To be sure,
in situations of financial distress, economic burdens are often
disseminated to a range of direct and indirect constituents, such
that—at least in theory—a narrative might focus on many potential
parties. Clearly, the commercial debtor and its lenders are relevant
parties. Once in bankruptcy, the parties might include a bankruptcy
trustee, to the extent one is appointed, 53 or the debtor in
possession. 54 Whether within or outside of bankruptcy, the debtor’s
50. Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1990).
51. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003).
52. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
53. Although a trustee is not commonly appointed in Chapter 11 cases, one may be
appointed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (defining “debtor in possession” to mean the debtor
except where a trustee has been appointed). The debtor in possession “generally has the
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management and advisors, its affiliated entities and equity security
holders,55 and its creditors, 56 including involuntary creditors, may
be parties, as well as any other persons with a vested interest in the
restructuring outcome.57 In each case, parties can be identified as
separate legal entities, as in the case of a corporate debtor or
institutional lender, 58 or on the basis of aggregation methods
authorized by procedural rules, as in the case of consolidated
debtors. 59 Other parties may be identified collectively pursuant to
agency arrangements, such as groups of syndicate lenders
contractually bound to collective action mechanisms set forth in
their credit agreements. 60 Finally, parties may be identified
collectively pursuant to transitory groupings imposed by law. For
instance, in a Chapter 11 case, similarly situated claimants may be
recognized collectively in official committees comprising persons
holding the largest claims. 61 Each of these parties may be further
deconstructed by piercing tiers of entities and unraveling agency
relationships to identify all persons with an economic interest in the
restructuring.

authority to exercise the same powers as a trustee.” Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Serv. Merch. Co.,
396 F.3d 737, 742 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108 (2000)).
55. The term “equity security holder” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “holder of an
equity security of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (2012). An “equity security” means a “share
in a corporation, whether or not transferable or denominated ‘stock,’ or similar security; interest
of a limited partner in a limited partnership; or warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to
purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, security, or interest of a kind specified.” 11 U.S.C. §
101(16).
56. “Creditor” means an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time
of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).
57. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 248–57 (1999) (describing a multiple constituency approach to corporate law).
58. The debtor may be a corporation formed under state law; similarly, a lender may be a
national banking association formed under federal law. These and other entities are granted legal
personhood. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include “corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships . . . as well as individuals”).
59. Bankruptcy cases involving affiliated entities are typically consolidated for procedural
purposes. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
60. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing credit
documents intended for collective action by an agent acting on behalf of lenders); Beal Sav. Bank
v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 318, 332 (N.Y. 2007) (explaining credit documents “intended for collective
action”).
61. Committees are appointed to represent the interests of various stakeholders. 11
U.S.C. § 1102 (authorizing the appointment of creditors’ and equity security holders’
committees).
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In practice, Chapter 11 confers party status in a more restrictive
manner,
thereby
limiting
participation—and,
ultimately,
competition—in the restructuring process. A “unitary actor” 62
construct posits that the relevant parties to a restructuring are the
principal debtor entity, an aggregated pool of the debtor’s equity
security holders, and an aggregated pool of the most powerful
creditors (generally, but not always, secured creditors). 63 In most
restructuring narratives, two of these aggregated actors emerge as
the key parties. 64 The debtor, 65 on the one hand, is generally
constructed as a single, unified, rational actor that takes calculated
action in response to corporate distress. 66 The most influential
creditors, on the other hand, are taken collectively as a single,
unified group 67 that also engages in purposive conduct. Within this
binary framework, each of these aggregated actors is believed to
approach negotiations as it would any other pursuit of deliberate,
consistent, and goal-oriented conduct in accordance with its own
“single standard of rationality.” 68 To this end, the legal process
62. The term is referenced in ALLISON, supra note 27, at 73 n.111. See also JAMES SAMUEL
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 504 (1994) (exploring the “unitary actor”).
63. The acclaimed bankruptcy attorney Harvey Miller likens such parties to “stars” in a
bankruptcy case “play.” Miller, supra note 8. More recently, Professor Michelle Harner identified
these parties to corporate bankruptcies in Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased
Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 471 (2011). This conception
is also apparent in language used by courts. See, e.g., Winters v. George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d
130, 133 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he stay is for the protection of the debtor and its creditors.”).
64. Professor Adam Levitin notes the limited range of constituents who are represented
in a typical bankruptcy, acknowledging that the process tends to focus upon the debtor and its
creditors. Levitin, supra note 13, at 1402.
65. The corporation’s status as an entity, association, and person under the law has been
explored in great detail. See Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (exploring
legal theories of corporate personhood).
66. See generally supra note 21, and sources cited therein.
67. “In Chapter 11, bankruptcy provides a forum for creditors to make a collective
decision about the viability of a firm.” Levitin, supra note 13, at 1445. Creditors are frequently
assumed to be homogeneous notwithstanding that “creditors” can include traditional lenders,
trade creditors and other institutions with divergent investment strategies. See MICHAEL A.
JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
165 (2000).
68. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
551 (1974) (identifying conceptual distortions in traditional commitment theory, which are
“reinforced by the additional assumptions that each side in the deterrence equation is a unitary,
purposive actor and that action choices and payoffs of the actors may be analyzed and calculated
by means of a single standard of rationality”). Although the unitary actor model has been
developed and critiqued most extensively in the field of international relations, scholars have
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focuses strictly upon the interplay of certain unitary actors, who are
assumed to “perform large actions for large reasons.” 69
For instance, similarly situated unsecured creditors are
recognized collectively in official committees comprising persons
holding the largest claims. 70 Additional committees may be
appointed to represent creditors or equity security holders. 71 What
is more, Chapter 11 directs courts to analyze pivotal questions from
the perspective of unitary actors. In approving settlements,
bankruptcy courts determine whether the arrangement is in the best
interests of the debtor, the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and
aggregated groups of similarly-situated creditors and equity security
holders. 72 In confirming a Chapter 11 plan, 73 courts examine
acceptance of the plan and impairment of claims on a class-by-class
basis, 74 with these classes designated by the debtor based on the
legal similarity of claims. 75 Numerous other provisions of Chapter
11 require that a court consider “the best interests of the creditors
and the [Debtor’s] estate,” and the analysis is similarly restricted to
these large organizational actors. 76 The unitary actor construct
persists even where the debtor is steered by self-interested
managers, and even where there are conflicting factions of creditors
or equity security holders jockeying for control. 77 As Professor Barry

acknowledged the model’s persistent application to corporate decision-making as well. See, e.g.,
BORIS HOLZER, MORALIZING THE CORPORATION: TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 111 (2010).
69. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 5.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., In re Refco, 505 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he bankruptcy court
approved the Settlement as being in the best interests of the debtors, their estates and
creditors.”).
73. The debtor exits Chapter 11 bankruptcy upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1121.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (authorizing the debtor to classify claims for plan confirmation
purposes).
76. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (setting forth the standard of review for motions to
convert a case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7).
77. JENSEN, supra note 67 (stating that “[i]ntra-debtholder conflicts over wealth transfers
are highly visible in bankruptcy proceedings,” yet scholars tend to “discuss[] the bondholderstockholder conflict as if there were only two homogenous classes of capital claims on the
corporation”); see also Antje Brunner & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Corporate Debt Restructuring: Evidence
on Lender Coordination in Financial Distress (C.F.S., Working Paper No. 2001/04, 2001)
(examining the difficulty of obtaining consensus among lenders).
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Adler explains, the law promotes a unitary actor framework through
its reliance on majority rule; for instance, “the right to veto a plan on
the basis of unfair discrimination is a class-based right—not
available to individual dissenters within an accepting class of
claims.” 78
Courts largely decline to broaden the scope of the analysis. As
the Second Circuit explained, “[The bankruptcy court’s] (only)
obligations in evaluating the Settlement [are] to the Debtors’ estate,
creditors and shareholders.” 79 Judicial support of the unitary actor
construct is best illustrated by the evolving interpretation of laws
that govern participation in the restructuring process. In a Chapter
11 case, any “party in interest” may appear and be heard on any
issue.80 “Party in interest” is defined to include “the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security’s committee, a
creditor, an equity security holder [of the debtor], or any indenture
trustee.” 81 A party in interest may file a Chapter 11 plan where a
trustee has been appointed 82 or where the debtor’s exclusivity
period has terminated. 83 Similarly, a party in interest may challenge
the good faith of persons voting to approve a plan, 84 object to
confirmation of a plan, 85 or request that a court revoke confirmation
of a plan. 86
As originally drafted, “party in interest” was not intended to be
an exclusionary or underinclusive definition. 87 To the contrary,
drafters and early commentators hoped that an expansive definition
would allow a broad range of individual and minority interests to
78. Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General
Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 310 (2010).
79. In re Refco, 505 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2007).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
81. Id. The term “equity security holder” means a “holder of an equity security of the
debtor,” thereby excluding shareholders of, or investors in, entities that come within any of the
other classifications. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2)–(3).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1144.
87. “Section 102(3) states that the term ‘including’ is not limiting, and thus the use of
the word ‘including’ in section 1109(b) does not limit ‘party in interest’ status to those parties
referred to in the subsection.” 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1109.02 at 1109–22. See also In re
Cloud Nine, Ltd., 3. B.R. 199 (Bankr. N.M. 1980) (articulating a liberal right to be heard from an
early Chapter 11 case).
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intervene in Chapter 11 cases, and expressly warned that undue
restrictions on who may be a party in interest might enable
dominant interests to control the restructuring process. 88 Yet within
a few short years, courts began to construe the definition in a
restrictive fashion. For instance, a 1983 opinion by the Second
Circuit explained, “Bankruptcy courts were established to provide a
forum where creditors and debtors could settle their disputes and
thereby effectuate the objectives of the statute. Necessarily,
therefore, the Bank must be either a creditor or a debtor to invoke
the court’s jurisdiction.” 89 Similarly, courts have narrowed the
participatory role of parties in interest, suggesting that Chapter 11
grants such persons only a right to appear and be heard on issues
pertaining to the restructuring, rather than a right to legal
standing. 90 Even more, modern courts rarely grant meaningful
participation rights to persons beyond the expressly identified
statutory classifications of parties in interest. 91 And, while these
classifications may seem broad at first blush, in a complex
restructuring these categories are likely to encompass a limited
number of persons, such as agents representing an aggregate of
entities. As a result, persons are denied direct participation in the
bankruptcy process even though they will bear the economic
consequences.
The Second Circuit defended this approach in a case declining to
recognize standing on behalf of equity security holders of a creditor.

88. Drafters of a predecessor reorganization statute sought to ensure that minority
interests have access to the restructuring process. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing the commentary to 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (“[S]ection 1109(b)
continues the broad concept of the absolute right to be heard in order to ensure fair
representation of the case and prevent excessive control by insider groups. . . .”)).
89. In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983).
90. In re Sw. Equip. Rental, 152 B.R. 207, 209 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (“Section 1109
says that any party in interest, including a creditor, may raise and may appear and be heard on
any issue in a Chapter 11 case.” However, “[t]he statute does not necessarily mean that every
party in interest can obtain relief on every issue. In other words, the right to raise an issue and
to appear and be heard is not the same as standing.”).
91. In re James Wilson Assoc., 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 1992) (denying, essentially,
the inclusive statutory definition of “party in interest” by conducting a more limited
interpretation of the definition for the purposes of federal standing: “[W]e do not think that
Section 1109(b) was intended to waive other limitations on standing, such as that the claimant
be within the class of intended beneficiaries of the statute that he is relying on for his claim.”);
accord In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); S. Boulevard, Inc. v. Martin
Paint Stores, 207 B.R. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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Framing a narrative of corporate financial distress in accordance with
the unitary actor construct, the court explained: “Bankruptcy court is
a forum where creditors and debtors can settle their disputes with
each other. Any internal dispute between a creditor and that creditor’s
investors belongs elsewhere.” 92 Similarly, courts have repeatedly
declined to give standing to creditors who seek to raise claims that
implicate the debtor’s internal governance. 93 Even bankruptcy
disclosure rules, 94 which were designed to foster transparency and
fairness, 95 decline to peer into unitary actors. And, notwithstanding
recent reform efforts, 96 disclosure obligations continue to be
assigned to agents representing large pools of creditors rather than
to each individual creditor. 97
Courts presiding over Chapter 11 cases also consistently decline
to investigate how parties ascend to positions of dominance and
assume control of unitary actors. 98 In this spirit, a fairly pronounced
affirmation of the unitary actor construct was made by a United
States bankruptcy court: “[A] bankruptcy court’s obligation is to
determine whether a settlement is in the best interests of the estate,
not to ensure that the creditors’ representatives are honoring their
fiduciary duties.” 99 As the Second Circuit intimated, such a model is
rooted in broader judicial efficiency concerns:
[h]ad the bankruptcy court permitted [the creditor’s equity
investors] to object to the Settlement and conduct discovery on the

92. In re Refco, Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2007).
93. In re Sw. Equip. Rental, 152 B.R. at 210 (“[A]s a general rule, a creditor does not have
standing to object to a corporation’s voluntary bankruptcy case on the ground that the board of
directors did not properly authorize it.”); see also In re Ives, 113 F. 911 (6th Cir. 1902) (declining
to grant a creditor standing to challenge a partnership’s voluntary petition on the grounds that
the general partner lacked mental competency).
94. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.
95. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701, 702–04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (articulating
the policy rationale for Rule 2019).
96. See Tiffany Kary, Federal Judge Says Rules Needed To Bar Bankruptcy Failure Bets,
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 05, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=anpx7s.ZUivc; Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2003, 2019, 3001, 4004, and 6003 [hereinafter “Proposed Amendments”]; Proposed
Adoption of New Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 1004.2 and 3002.1, Absent Contrary
Congressional Action (Redline Version), 2011 U.S. Order 0018 (C.O. 0018) (Apr. 26, 2011).
97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.
98. See infra notes 99 through 107 and accompanying text.
99. In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2007). See Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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numerous factual issues that . . . would prove that the Settlement
“was the product of tortious misconduct, collusion, and fraud by a
faithless fiduciary,” . . . the . . . goal of a “speedy and efficient
reorganization,” would have been frustrated. 100

Acknowledging the very serious claims of unlawful conduct alleged
by the creditor’s equity investors, the court concluded that such a
“litany of wrongs . . . is fodder for a lengthy trial itself. It surely
would have caused a substantial delay in the . . . bankruptcy
proceeding.” 101 Declining to grant the creditor’s equity investors
standing in the bankruptcy case, the court explained, “[B]ankruptcy
court is not the appropriate forum in which to resolve [such]
disputes. It may be that the [creditor] violated . . . fiduciary duties
by entering a settlement that was not in the best interests of [its
equity investors]. That issue, however, is not for the bankruptcy
court.” 102
Justifying a limited focus of this sort, courts generally assume
that Chapter 11 participants act in good faith to translate profitmaximization goals into efficient restructuring outcomes. 103 And,
although courts readily acknowledge the propensity for actors to
engage in anticompetitive practices in the course of a
restructuring, 104 they largely decline to focus upon or take steps to
expose such conduct. Trusting a market clearinghouse function,
courts typically assume that if an organizational actor were
exercising authority in a manner that was detrimental to its
constituent members, such members would strip the actor of its
authority.105 Thus, as the First Circuit explained, “If the unsecured

100. In re Refco, 505 F.3d at 119.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 118.
103. See, e.g., In re C & C Jewelry Mfg., Inc., 373 F. App’x 775, 777 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A
presumption of good faith accompanies the filing of an involuntary petition” by a creditor, and
the debtor has the burden of proving bad faith); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1016
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (“Workouts contemplate . . . participation from all parties in interest,
good faith, conciliation, and candor.”).
104. See, e.g., In re Washington Mut., Inc., 419 B.R. 271, 279 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)
(“[C]ollective action by creditors through the use of ad hoc committees or groups allows
creditors to utilize other group members’ holdings to obtain a greater degree of influence in a
bankruptcy case than single creditors acting alone.”); In re Gibson Group, 66 F.3d 1436, 1441
(6th Cir. 1995) (“A debtor-in-possession often acts under the influence of conflicts of interest
and may be tempted to use its discretion . . . to favor certain creditors over others . . . .”).
105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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creditors’ committee fails to be properly representative of the
unsecured creditors, any party in interest can move to have the
committee reconstituted.” 106 In opinions of this sort, judicial
efficiency is a primary justification for restricting focus to
organizational actors. As the influential United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York explained:
[I]t is important that a bankruptcy court is not too facile in granting
applications for standing. Overly lenient standards may potentially
over-burden the reorganization process by allowing numerous
parties to interject themselves into the case on every issue, thereby
thwarting the goal of a speedy and efficient reorganization. . . .
Granting peripheral parties status as parties in interest thwarts the
traditional purpose of bankruptcy laws which is to provide
‘reasonably expeditious rehabilitation of financially distressed
debtors with a consequent distribution to creditors. 107

Notwithstanding these judicial efficiency arguments, the Second
Circuit opined that it is not improper to buy a claim to obtain
standing in a bankruptcy proceeding. 108 Evidencing the realities of a
legal construct that so heavily privileges unitary actors, stakeholders
frequently acquire bankruptcy claims not because they value them
more highly, but because they can use them for the strategic purpose
of “obtain[ing] a seat at the negotiating table.” 109 As subsequent
sections explore, these constraints on participation have a
distortionary effect, thereby undercutting the fairness and efficiency
of negotiated restructuring outcomes.

B. Legal and Historical Roots of the Fallacy
As the preceding section articulates, Chapter 11 adopts a largely
binary framework whereby issues are framed and negotiated by
certain large, unitary actors. This focus upon unitary actors is a
product of early neoclassical economic analysis of law, which tended
to adopt simplistic assumptions of even the most internally complex

106. In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a)(2) (2012); In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R. 41, 42 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)).
107. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 850–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
108. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011).
109. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in
Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1158–59 (2011).
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organizations. 110 In essence, the traditional, neoclassical model
portrayed complex organizations, such as firms, as “simplemaximizing” entities, “operating with a set of given prices,
technologies and markets.” 111 What is more, this traditional
construction also largely ignored, and even obscured, the conflicts
and inefficiencies that occur within organizational actors. 112
Despite their persistence in bankruptcy law, many of these core
assumptions have been dismantled in the social sciences. 113 For one
thing, advancements in organizational theory undercut the assertion
that a complex organization can have a single, unified objective.114
Evidencing this changing tide, state-centric political scientist Robert
Gilpin concedes, “strictly speaking, states . . . have no interests, or
what economists call ‘utility functions,’ nor do bureaucracies,
interest groups, or so-called transnational actors, for that matter.” 115
Legal scholars have similarly acknowledged the limitations of the

110. Economist Harvey Leibenstein addressed the limitations of the rational actor
construct:
According to the strict neoclassical viewpoint, there is no relation between the formal
controller of the firm and the behavior of the firm. Thus, a one man firm . . . or a
large corporation whose stock is widely distributed . . . are . . . presumed to
operate the same way.
HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 161 (1978);
see also EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATIONS 290–91
(2004) (speaking of the firm as an “economic decision-making unit” rather than as a collection
of individual economic decision-making units); HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 28 (1960); JOSEPH W. MCGUIRE, THEORIES OF BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 19–
20, 46–72 (1964) (neoclassical theory assumes that firms make decisions in the same manner as
individuals).
111. J. D. Tomlinson, Economic and Sociological Theories of the Enterprise and Industrial
Democracy, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. 591, 591–92 (1984).
112. Professor David Strauss discusses the unitary actor paradigm in presidential decisionmaking. He explains: “Often the decision of the President is treated as if it were the act of a
unitary, purposive actor. In fact, presidential decisions are routinely the product of interest
group and bureaucratic pressures within the executive branch. ‘Presidential’ decisions are not
automatically more unitary than ‘congressional’ decisions.” David S. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 113 n.1 (1993).
113. The seminal work challenging the unitary actor construct is ALLISON, ESSENCE OF
DECISION, supra note 27; see also Simon Hug, Nonunitary Actors in Spatial Models: How Far Is Far in
Foreign Policy?, 43 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 479 (1999) (discussing growing skepticism towards the
unitary actor construct in international relations scholarship).
114. Where individuals share common interests, their “unorganized action [will] not be
able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest
adequately.” MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 7 (1965).
115. ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 18 (1981).
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unitary actor construct in work spanning a range of substantive
areas. 116
For example, corporate law scholars have contributed to an
enriched understanding of the complexities of large commercial
actors. Seminal works of Adolph Berle identify the agency conflicts
that cause large corporations to pursue decisions that are not
necessarily in the best interests of the enterprise or its
stakeholders. 117 Following in Berle’s footsteps, a rich and
interdisciplinary body of literature explores the effect of managerial
ownership on corporate decision-making. 118 Broadly speaking, these
works suggest that in light of the behavioral tendencies of the
humans who operate it, a firm, 119 much like a governmental
entity, 120 simply cannot be a unitary actor that acts deliberately to
pursue its own economic goals. Recent scholarship in bankruptcy
116. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1318 (2011) (“Private controlling shareholders . . . are . . .
not unitary actors when they are corporations. But authority within corporations is hierarchical,
so if one agent of the controlling shareholder corporation acts . . . her actions can fairly be
attributed to the corporation under normal agency law principles.”); Matthew C. Stephenson,

The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 13 n.25 (2008) (“This Article . . . neither assumes a single
legislative intent or will, nor relies on the assumption that all members of the legislature have
the same information. Rather, this Article assumes that the legislature employs some set of
institutional arrangements that generate stable equilibrium policy choices . . . and that the
equilibrium policy choice is affected by information that members of the legislature receive and
process concerning the impact of various policies on some normatively relevant set of
outcomes.”).
117. See generally ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (when shareholders are too dispersed to ensure that managers render
decisions that maximize the corporation’s value, agency problems arise whereby managers tend
to advance their own self-interests); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (exploring these arguments further).
118. See, e.g., J. R. Davies, David Hillier & Patrick McColgan, Ownership Structure,
Managerial Behaviour and Corporate Value, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 645 (2005); Kenneth A. Kim,
Pattanaporn Kitsabunnarat & John R. Nofsinger, Ownership and Operating Performance in an
Emerging Market: Evidence from Thai IPO Firms, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 355 (2004); Harold Demsetz &
Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155
(1985).
119. “Under any economic, social, or political system, individuals, business firms, and
organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous or
otherwise functional behavior.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 1 (1969). On
the need to align corporate managers’ individual economic incentives with the corporation’s
economic interests, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 20–27 (2006).
120. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1036 (2011) (“Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies,
like nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors. They are fractured internally.”).
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law continues in this academic tradition, carefully dissecting the
conflicting economic motivations of persons engaged in Chapter 11
cases and finding that these competing interests impact
restructuring outcomes. 121
Why, then, does the unitary actor framework continue to
dominate Chapter 11? For one thing, the model is clearly manifested
in the prevailing bankruptcy paradigm known as the “creditors’
bargain” model, which analyzes many issues that arise in bankruptcy
cases from the perspective of a fictitious, efficiency-enhancing
bargain amongst all creditors. 122 Yet the model’s roots reach beyond
bankruptcy theory. In many ways, the model reflects the relatively
conservative legal conceptions of the firm that have dominated
corporate law. While the precise contours of the relationship
between a firm and its stakeholders have evolved over time, the firm
has been largely construed as a privately-negotiated balancing of
rights and obligations of stakeholders, such that there is no
distinction between the economic interests of the firm as a unitary
actor and the aggregated interests of its stakeholders. 123
For instance, consider the classic approach to corporate
personhood: the “aggregate person” model. 124 Under this view, the
corporate entity should be the exclusive unit of analysis because
persons who comprise the corporation “merge” into it, thereby
disappearing from view. 125 The aggregate person model was further
amplified in the work of “nexus-of-contract” or “Contractarian”
scholars in the 1970s. 126 These authors and their progeny assert that

121. See supra note 20, and sources cited therein.
122. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (advancing the creditors’ bargain model); see also Barry E. Adler,
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
778 (1988). Professor Adam Levitin situates the creditors’ bargain model in the law and
economics movement, classifying it as a contractarian theory of bankruptcy law. See Levitin,
Bankrupt Politics, supra note 13, at 1405–06.
123. Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J.
OF CORP. L. 753 (2006) (discussing historical perceptions of the corporation); Geoff Lundeen
Carter, Agreements Within Government Entities and Conspiracies Under Section 1985(3)—A New
Exception to the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1996) (noting
“the common law tradition of regarding corporations as single, unitary actors”).
124. See Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 65, at 109–12.
125. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is . . . an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”).
126. “Nexus-of-contract” and “Contractarian” scholars include Frank Easterbrook and
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because stakeholders contract privately with each other to operate
via the firm, the law should respect these private agreements and
accept the firm as the pertinent actor, capable of shaping and
advancing its own and its stakeholders’ economic interests. 127
Moreover, this view of the firm asserts that efficient private
ordering among stakeholders naturally leads organizational actors to
engage in efficient transactions with third parties. 128 In other words,
profit-maximizing stakeholders, negotiating with each other in a
competitive market, advance organizational decisions that are likely
to lead to the greatest net overall increase in stakeholders’
welfare. 129 To the extent the organization pursues some other
course, it is assumed that stakeholders would take rapid action to
restore efficient exercise of organizational power. 130 A leading work
in political economy reveals the extreme reductionism of such an
argument in the analogous context of governmental decisionmaking: “[t]he logic underlying this view is simple and compelling:
if a politician were making transfers in an inefficient manner, he or
she would be voted out of office.” 131
Over time, this unitary actor conception of the firm came to be
associated with powerful normative beliefs as to the relationship
between law and transactional activity. 132 As early defenders of
neoclassical economic analysis of law assert, intra-firm dynamics are
simply immaterial to the regulation of the firm’s ultimate pursuits in
Daniel Fischel. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also Jonathan Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266
(1999).
127. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415 (1989) (under the “nexus of contracts” approach, “the firm is a legal
fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of
production”); Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor
Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, in JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM, supra note 67, at 136–37
(“We view the corporation as a legal entity that serves as a nexus for a complex set of explicit
and implicit contracts among disparate individuals.”).
128. See infra notes 129 and 130 and sources cited therein.
129. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (positing that the contractual
nature of corporate relationships leads to efficient corporate outcomes).
130. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 1210 (1995) (under the Chicago School, “political competition will ensure that the
most efficient method of redistribution available is chosen”).
131. Id. at 1211.
132. See infra notes 134 through 137 and accompanying text.
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the marketplace. 133 Acknowledging the effects of this view on
American law, economist Oliver Williamson used the term “legal
forbearance” to refer to the relative unavailability of legal process
with respect to intra-firm disputes, noting that such disputes are
part of the “implicit contract law of internal organization,” which
rests in the domain of private ordering rather than public law. 134 In
essence, the bargaining and exchange of promises that occur in
forming and managing the firm are viewed as a matter of private
exchange, beyond the reach of the law (other than those laws
specifically pertaining to intra-firm governance). 135 As one
prominent work explained, “the behavior of the organization is like
the equilibrium behavior of a market.” 136 It should be no surprise,
then, that the aggregate person construct of the firm, as amplified by
Contractarians, generally accompanies a laissez-faire approach to
business law and market regulation. 137 In particular, this approach
wages a powerful resistance to legal reforms that look beyond the
needs of dominant constituents.138
As a result, by the late 1970s, when Chapter 11 was enacted, the
works of Berle and his progeny had been unfittingly relegated to the
shelves of those who study corporate governance and other internal,
decidedly private affairs of the firm. As to the firm’s activities with
and among third parties, it was generally assumed that while there
may be differences in the underlying goals of stakeholders, such
variances were the subject of negotiation in a competitive market
and resolved via private agreement. 139 In the absence of evidence

133. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON.
211 (1950); Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS (1953).
134. Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 159 (1991).
135. “The normative implications of the aggregate paradigm are that corporations should
be regarded as the product of private initiative and natural market forces, that corporations
reflect forms of private property and private contract, and that corporate law should therefore be
viewed as private law, not public law.” Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 65, at 111.
136. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM, supra note 67, at 136.
137. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489–90 (1989) (“[C]ontract theory was hostile to state
regulation and to the management corporation simultaneously . . . . For example . . .
contractualism served as the vehicle for protecting corporations from government regulation
under the equal protection clause.”).
138. Id.
139. Professor Michael Klausner contextualizes contractarian theory thusly: “The core
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that the actions of the firm are not in compliance with these internal
agreements,140 such actions should be taken as efficient translations
of the aggregated stakeholders’ interests. In the bankruptcy context,
these core tenets of neoclassical economic theory, and especially the
unitary actor model, enduringly obscured internal dynamics of
complex commercial actors.
III. CHALLENGING THE EFFICIENCY FALLACY
As the previous sections explain, Chapter 11 suffers from
structural limitations that introduce a distortionary effect. Namely, it
invites to the bargaining table only certain large organizational
actors. At the same time, it declines to investigate the internal
dynamics that allow certain stakeholders to assume beneficial
control of these negotiating parties.
Of course, a richer appraisal of Chapter 11 negotiations requires
a deeper exploration of these internal dynamics. Fortunately, a rich
body of modern social science literature offers tools to accomplish
this very task. In the following sections, I develop an explanatory
model that offers a richer alternative to the dominant, neoclassical
economic paradigm. This alternative model draws primarily upon
approaches utilized in the field of political economy. It also engages
with other contemporary social science, spanning the fields of
organizational theory, behavioral decision theory, and public choice
economics, yielding an analytical framework that more properly
accounts for institutional and political dynamics in commercial
restructurings. The insights gained from this new explanatory model
are particularly relevant to modern Chapter 11 reform efforts.

innovation of the theory was to conceptualize the relationship between management and
shareholders of a public company as one of contract—a ‘corporate contract’—in which joint
wealth would be maximized as a result of atomistic market-mediated actions.” Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–
80 (2006).
140. These principles are fully in evidence in the dichotomy between corporate acts that
are “intra vires,” and therefore valid, versus those that are “ultra vires” and therefore invalid. In
corporate law, the business judgment rule effectively serves as a presumption that a corporate
act is lawful, absent a contrary showing. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
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A. Background: Modern Political Economy

The political economy theoretical framework strives to explain
how political forces shape economic outcomes, as well as how
economic forces shape political outcomes. 141 Political economists
explore the relationships between governance factors and policy
outcomes, focusing on the activities of governmental units, business
and political associations, and informal groups and coalitions. 142 In
recent decades, the field of political economy has been deeply
influenced by scholarship in the areas of behavioral decision theory,
organizational theory, and public choice economics. 143 As a result,
the field has become a powerful cross-disciplinary tool for exploring
the mechanisms through which institutions and their stakeholders
gain authority, dominance, and control to exert pressure and drive
outcomes. 144
Professors Eric Posner 145 and David Skeel 146 have made
prominent use of insights from political economy in their efforts to
analyze the role of powerful pressure groups in the bankruptcy
lawmaking process. Most recently, Professor Adam Levitin draws
upon theories of political economy to consider the feasibility of a
statutory scheme under which states could file for bankruptcy, and
to propose a political theory of bankruptcy law more broadly. 147

141. Political economy explores, inter alia, “how the wealthy and, in particular, how
political decisions and interests influence the location of economic activities and the distribution
of the costs and benefits of these activities,” as well as “the effect of markets and economic
forces on the distribution of power and welfare among states and other political actors.” ROBERT
GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10–11 (1987).
142. Supra note 23.
143. See, e.g., KEVIN A. CARSON, ORGANIZATION THEORY: A LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVE (2008)
(exploring state intervention in corporate affairs, using a theoretical framework influenced by
organizational theory); Thomas Palfrey, Experiments in Political Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (2006) (exploring decision theory and game theoretic models in political
economy).
144. Political economy as a mode of analysis has been applied in a range of fields. See, e.g.,
Johan Arndt, The Political Economy Paradigm: Foundation for Theory Building in Marketing, 47 J.
MARKETING 44 (1983) (applying political economy analyses to marketing theory).
145. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 47 (1997).
146. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1998).
147. See generally Levitin, Bankrupt Politics, supra note 13.
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However, beyond these works exploring the bankruptcylawmaking process and restructurings of governmental entities, legal
scholars have not yet applied these modern social science
perspectives to critique Chapter 11. In the following section, I
explore the methods of modern political economy, and develop an
alternative model that more accurately explains commercial
restructuring outcomes.

B. A New Model for Exploring Commercial Bankruptcies Under Chapter 11
This section advances a new explanatory model for examining
situations of corporate financial distress, which draws upon political
economy and related fields of social science to develop a clearer
understanding of how Chapter 11 outcomes are negotiated by and
among complex organizational actors. 148 In particular, it encourages
a more thorough analysis of the parties and interests that shape
restructuring outcomes. The approach considers how parties to
Chapter 11 cases gain control of organizational actors to promote
restructuring outcomes that privilege the economic interests of some
stakeholders while subordinating the rights of others. By
encouraging a more nuanced analysis of commercial restructurings,
it exposes the Efficiency Fallacy and demonstrates the limitations of
market mechanisms in commercial restructurings.
As a preliminary matter, the new explanatory model dismantles
unitary actors, scrutinizing constituent interests within the “debtor,”
“creditors,” or other aggregated actors. In this way, the model looks
beyond conceptual barriers imposed by agency relationships to
identify the true drivers of organizational decisions. 149 Generally
speaking, stakeholders of distressed firms seek to maximize their
own profits or minimize their own losses, as the case may be. But in
the context of complex commercial restructurings, stakeholders may
have additional investments in, or relationships with, the debtor. 150

148. This framework is based upon methodology set forth in JEFFRY FRIEDEN, DEBT,
DEVELOPMENT & DEMOCRACY 16 (1991).
149. Of course, restructuring outcomes may be framed as beneficial to one group of
constituents, when in fact they are intended to benefit a dominant pressure group. Political
scientists observe similar dynamics in the lawmaking process. William C. Mitchell & Michael C.
Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991).
150. An expanded inquiry is necessary in light of modern financial engineering. For
instance, where creditors hold credit default swaps, they have no incentive to consent to a
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For instance, in the WorldCom restructuring, 151 an SEC inquiry
found that a creditor appointed to the creditors’ committee, in light
of its $400 million claim, in fact hedged all but $6.5 million of this
investment, and therefore did not possess an economic interest
worthy of appointment to the committee over other creditors with
far greater actual economic exposure. 152 As this example suggests,
stakeholders can have complex economic positions in relation to the
Chapter 11 debtor, and such positions necessarily factor into the
stakeholder’s ultimate preferences. 153
Furthermore, it is important to consider how stakeholders work
together to influence restructuring outcomes. As Professor
Gourevitch explains, “[t]he structures set up to manage policy are
themselves important allocators of power.” 154 Thus, “[d]ecisions
about who is represented, how, and with what perquisites affect how
policy is formed and implemented.” 155 We cannot simply accept at
face value the grouping mechanisms imposed by Chapter 11 or
pursuant to the parties’ own private ordering, since certain
stakeholders may take extraordinary predicate steps to capture
control within these structures. For instance, whether within or
outside of bankruptcy, parties at times make secret deals to buy
votes from certain other constituents to meet consent thresholds. 156
Similarly, in Chapter 11, participants at times buy controlling
interests in other securities of the debtor to gain the right to vote in
plan confirmation proceedings on behalf of additional classes. 157 In

restructuring. Lubben, supra note 43, at 427–29.
151. In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2002 WL 1732646 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22,
2002).
152. In re Greenfield, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52744, at 8 (Nov. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-52744.pdf (remedial sanctions and ceaseand-desist order).
153. Broader appreciation of an actor’s interests is needed to overcome the assumptions
addressed in Woo, supra note 20. In particular, Woo explains that profit maximization
assumptions fail to take into consideration the need for financial institutions to comply with
regulatory requirements.
154. GOUREVITCH, supra note 18, at 231.
155. Id.
156. Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP v. LifeCare Holdings Inc., 377 F. App’x. 422
(5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a borrower offered to pay an increased fee to certain holdout
lenders in exchange for consent to an out-of-court restructuring).
157. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 102 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that purchasing
claims in bankruptcy “for the purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not of
itself amount to ‘bad faith.’” Nor is it improper to buy a claim to obtain standing to file a
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cases of this sort, attention must be given to these predicate
measures, and to their effects on the overall efficiency of the
restructuring process. As economist George Stigler observed in his
work on public choice, when dominant interests are left unchecked,
they strive to capture institutions so that they can extract rents. 158
In essence, a full appreciation of the social costs requires a richer
picture of the strategic exchanges that take place beyond the
bargaining table.
Along these lines, collective action principles can be used to
better understand how groups of stakeholders are able to influence
restructuring outcomes. 159 These insights reveal that some
stakeholders are better able to translate their individual profit
maximization goals into restructuring outcomes, while other groups
struggle with collective action problems. 160 In particular, smaller and
more concentrated groups that offer their members appreciable
benefits do not typically suffer from a lack of cohesion, whereas large
and highly dispersed groups are more susceptible. 161 Similarly, as
Professor David Skeel has explored,162 consent mechanisms, voting
thresholds, and other institutional dynamics can and do impact the
functionality of collective action in Chapter 11.163 Consistent with
these theoretical models, scholarship by Professor Kelli Alces
identifies the collective action problems confronted by equity
security holders of large corporations. 164 The following section
competing plan.); see also Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191
(exploring claims trading as a means of gaining influence over a bankruptcy process); Figter Ltd.
v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635, 637 (9th Cir.1997)
(creditors in one class arranged for a controlling voice in another class to control the
restructuring outcome); In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 333 B.R. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same),
rev’d, 600 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2010).
158. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
159. Collective action principles are explored in OLSON, supra note 114; see also ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990).
160. OSTROM, supra note 159, at 29.
161. OLSON, supra note 114, at 48.
162. David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).
163. The foundational social science work on consent mechanisms is JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1962).
164. Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717 (2010).
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applies these insights to recent Chapter 11 cases in an effort to
expose the limitations of the Efficiency Fallacy and develop a better
understanding of Chapter 11 negotiations.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS
As previous sections argue, the Efficiency Fallacy fails to
consider how internal dynamics undercut the ability of market
mechanisms to fairly and efficiently apportion rights. The following
sections apply insights from political economy to explore the
Chapter 11 cases of Washington Mutual Bank, previously one of the
nation’s largest banking institutions, and General Growth Properties,
a leading commercial real estate management company. In both
cases, stakeholders disagreed with each other and with the debtors’
management on a number of critical issues, and these disagreements
needed to be resolved during the course of the Chapter 11 case
before the debtors could emerge from bankruptcy. The purpose of
these case studies is to reveal possible distortionary effects of
Chapter 11 that impair the efficiency of these negotiations and the
fairness of the ultimate restructuring outcomes. The insights gained
from this analysis are particularly useful in reassessing the normative
foundations of the law of corporate financial distress and in
proposing legal reforms.
Before turning to the case studies, a few points should be made.
Recall that under the early neoclassical economic model, negotiated
outcomes are taken to be the efficient result of profit-maximizing
choices by large organizational actors who are deemed capable of
taking deliberate steps to advance their own interests. The structural
privileges afforded to unitary actors (and, by extension, to their
controlling stakeholders) are justified by a neoclassical belief that
decisions made by organizational actors reflect the aggregated
interests of constituents, and negotiations among such actors in a
competitive market generate equilibrium. 165 Thus, negotiated
outcomes are believed to reflect the underlying value of the debtors’
assets versus liabilities, which are assumed to be a function of
demand in a competitive market. 166 In this manner, the Efficiency
Fallacy declares that negotiated outcomes are most advantageous for
all constituents; if a better, more economically productive allocation
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part II.A.
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of the debtor’s assets were possible, the market clearinghouse
functions within each organizational actor and the overall efficiency
of the restructuring process would have enabled such other outcome
to prevail. In other words, those able to make better use of the
debtor’s resources would have been willing to pay more for them,
yielding a different outcome.
Yet the case studies reveal institutional dynamics that controvert
these assumptions. Although the prevailing construct “impl[ies]
coincidence of perceptions, control of choice, and coordination of
movement” within each organizational actor, 167 the case studies
demonstrate that constituent groups are highly fractured, harboring
deeply conflicting views regarding the underlying value of the
debtor’s assets and the proper course for maximizing such value.
Furthermore, certain organizational actors, such as the debtor,
are especially subject to capture by dominant, self-interested factions
or individuals. And, rather than relying on a true market
clearinghouse function to resolve conflicts, powerful stakeholders are
able to engage in strategic, opportunistic, and other anticompetitive
conduct to obtain control, monopolize restructuring outcomes, and
extract rents. As a result, certain persons tend to have greater power
and privilege from the outset. Generally speaking, Washington
Mutual’s restructuring outcome favored parties who obtained
concentrated power and authority (such as the company’s corporate
creditors), at the expense of other parties (such as equity security
holders) who were too dispersed to gain meaningful influence. In
contrast, General Growth’s restructuring favored certain equity
security holders, who were able to gain concentrated power early in
the process, at the expense of widely dispersed creditors. But the
neoclassical paradigm declines to shed light upon these internal
dynamics. Thus, not only does the legal construct produce a
distortionary effect, it also shields these very distortions from view.
These themes will be further dissected in subsequent sections.

A. The Washington Mutual Chapter 11 Case
The Washington Mutual Chapter 11 filing is unique in that it
followed on the heels of the largest bank failure in United States
history. 168 Seattle-based Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WMI”) 169 was a
167. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 246.
168. Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y.
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savings and loan holding company that wholly owned its banking
subsidiary, Washington Mutual Bank, FA (“WMB”). 170
Originally founded in 1889 after the Great Seattle Fire, 171 by
2006 Washington Mutual was the largest thrift holding company in
the United States 172 and the eighth largest credit-card issuer. 173
Industry observers routinely referred to the banking behemoth as a
leading U.S. financial institution. 174 In 2006, WMI’s capital stock
surged to record highs 175 and by 2008 WMB was the seventh largest
among all U.S. bank and thrift holding companies. 176
In the years immediately preceding its demise, Washington
Mutual was particularly active in residential mortgage
originations. 177 After the United States housing market collapsed in
2007, the value of securities tied to real estate mortgages
tumbled. 178 Washington Mutual suffered severe losses, particularly
in its riskier subprime lending business. 179
In February 2008, in response to deterioration in Washington
Mutual’s financial condition, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(“OTS”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)

TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A1.
169. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., filed with the
Washington Secretary of State on Aug. 17, 1994.
170. The banking subsidiary, Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, Nevada, was
organized as a federal savings association insured under 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a). See OFFICES OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK [hereinafter “INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT”], at
Appendix 2.
171. George Erb, JPMorgan Should Donate Its WaMu Artifacts, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., June 14,
2009. On the institution’s early history, see generally MURRAY MORGAN, THE FRIEND OF THE
FAMILY: 100 YEARS WITH WASHINGTON MUTUAL (1989).
172. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 14, 2005).
173. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 14 (Mar. 15, 2006).
174. See, e.g., Robert O’Connor, That’s Affordable: Seattle-based Washington Mutual Has Built a
Serious Business Around Community Outreach and Affordable Lending, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 31,
2005, at 73 (referring to the “lending giant”).
175. Will Edwards, Washington Mutual Earnings Rise on Providian Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
18, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMwatJskzJYE.
176. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 29, 2008).
177. Id. at 69 (“For the year ended December 31, 2007, proceeds from the sale of loans
originated and held for sale were approximately $78.93 billion.”).
178. The subprime lending crisis, and Washington Mutual’s role in particular, are explored
in KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011).
179. See id.
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lowered the bank’s safety and soundness rating to a 3, on a scale of 1
to 5, signaling it was a troubled institution. 180 By late summer 2008,
Washington Mutual estimated it could face $19 billion in losses over
the next several years from underperforming and defaulting
mortgage loans. 181 As investor confidence sank, the parent
company’s stock price began to tumble. 182 In mid-September 2008, a
bank run drained the institution of more than $17 billion in deposits
in an eight-day period. 183 OTS and the FDIC lowered the bank’s
safety and soundness rating once again, signaling that the bank could
fail. 184
On September 25, 2008, WMB was seized by OTS. 185 OTS
appointed the FDIC as receiver, 186 and as such the FDIC “by
operation of law, succeed[ed] to all rights, titles, powers, and
privileges” of WMB, and of any “stockholder, member,
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution with
respect to the institution and the assets of the institution . . . .” 187
In essence, under federal law the FDIC stepped into the shoes of
WMB and WMI, to the extent WMI owned the outstanding stock of
WMB, and, in that capacity, was entitled to “marshal[] assets of
[the] failed institution[] for the benefit of its creditors.” 188
Washington Mutual’s failure threatened to deplete the FDIC’s
$45 billion Deposit Insurance Fund. 189 Acting under its broad
180. Letter from OTS to Washington Mutual Bank (Feb. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
181. Washington Mutual, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at (July 22, 2008).
182. Eric Dash & Geraldine Fabrikant, Washington Mutual Stock Falls on Investor Fears, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at C1.
183. Press Release, Senate Subcommittee Holds Second Hearing on Wall Street and the
Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators, 1848 PLI/CORP 363, (Apr. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=9c58e384-4c2f-4151-bc2b0b21e5070b0b.
184. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 170, at 18.
185. OTS, Order Number 2008-36, Sept. 25, 2008.
186. Letter from OTS to WMB (Sept. 25, 2008) (notifying WSB of the FDIC’s appointment
as receiver) (on file with author).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii).
188. U.S. ex rel. RTC v. Schroeder, 86 F.3d 114, 117 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Courtney v.
Halleran, No. 02-C-6926, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18795, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2004)
(“[W]hen the FDIC is appointed receiver of an insolvent bank, it essentially ‘steps into the
shoes’ of that bank and assumes control of the bank’s rights and assets, including certain causes
of action the bank might have against other parties.”).
189. Marcy Gordon, Federal Bank Insurance Fund Slips Below Target Level, USA TODAY (Sept.
17, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-09-17-fdic-fundbelow-target-amount_N.htm; Linda Shen, WaMu’s Bank Split From Holding Company, Sparing
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power, the FDIC determined that a sale of all of the assets, deposits,
and other liabilities of WMB would be the best course. A sale of this
sort was made feasible by Washington Mutual’s corporate structure.
The company’s banking-related assets and liabilities were titled in
the subsidiary, WMB, rather than in the parent company, WMI. In
contrast, much of the corporate debt of Washington Mutual was in
the name of the corporate parent, WMI. Similarly, Washington
Mutual’s publicly-traded common and preferred equity security
interests were issued by the parent company. However,
notwithstanding the legal separateness of WMI and WMB, the two
entities historically had identical and overlapping management and
treated their assets and liabilities as “connected[,]. . .commingled
and intertwined.” 190
Thus, on the same day as the bank seizure, the FDIC
orchestrated the sale of substantially all of WMB’s assets to
JPMorgan Chase Bank (“JPMorgan”), in exchange for JPMorgan
paying WMI $1.88 billion in cash plus JPMorgan’s assumption of
more than $145 billion in bank deposits, covered bonds and other
secured liabilities of WMB. 191 Thanks to the sale transaction,
WMB’s collapse “came at ‘zero cost’ to the insurance fund” 192 in the
form of payments from the deposit insurance fund. 193 In the wake of
the sale, JPMorgan disclosed that it realized nearly $12 billion from
the transaction. 194

(Update
1),
BLOOMBERG
(Sep.
26,
2008),
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a2VofC5midrw; see also Wall Street and
the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter Wall Street Hearing].
190. Complaint at 11–12, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Washington Mut., Inc., Bankr.
No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 09-50551 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2009).
191. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & JPMorgan Chase Bank, Purchase and Assumption
Agreement: Whole Bank (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_
Mutual_P_and_A.pdf [hereinafter Purchase Agreement].
192. Shen, supra note 189.
193. However, the FDIC provided indemnification for claims based on the rights of any
shareholders, creditors, officers, employees and depositors of Washington Mutual. See Purchase
Agreement, supra note 191, at 25–26. The FDIC justified indemnification on the grounds that
“such assistance is necessary to meet the obligations of the [FDIC] to provide insurance
coverage for the insured deposits in [WMB],” and indemnification was the “least costly . . .
method[] for meeting such obligation.” Id. at 1. Indemnification is permitted under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(2)(A).
194. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 166 (Feb. 28, 2011).
FDIC
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The sale of WMB to JPMorgan was accomplished on an
expedited basis in part because JPMorgan had been standing by as a
ready and willing buyer. In fact, the New York-based banking giant
made its first attempt to acquire WMB five months before the bank’s
September 2008 failure. 195 In March 2008, at the invitation of OTS
and the FDIC, several prospective buyers of Washington Mutual
reviewed the bank’s books and records. 196 In April 2008, JPMorgan
made a public offer to acquire Washington Mutual from WMI’s
shareholders for $8 per share, payable in JPMorgan stock. 197
Washington Mutual was able to resist this allegedly “low-ball
bid” 198 by obtaining a capital infusion from a private equity firm. 199
Although the infusion allowed the ailing bank to temporarily
comply with banking capitalization requirements, regulatory
pressure continued. In fact, Washington Mutual bondholders allege
that in the months following JPMorgan’s April 2008 acquisition
attempt, JPMorgan used and disclosed WMI’s confidential financial
information to both pressure federal regulators to increase oversight
of WMB and to harvest negative sentiments about WMI among
rating agencies, media and investors. 200 In particular, bondholders
allege that JPMorgan engaged in a “lobbying effort to convince
federal regulators to seize and sell off Washington Mutual’s assets at
a fire-sale price that [JPMorgan] would be strategically positioned to
take advantage of.” 201 WMI echoed these accusations in its own
lawsuit against the FDIC and also complained that the assets of
WMB sold to JPMorgan, less the liabilities assumed, were worth
substantially more than the $1.88 billion cash consideration received
in the deal.202
In the wake of the September 2008 acquisition, corporate parent
WMI was stripped of its key operating subsidiary and business
assets. Since JPMorgan did not assume Washington Mutual’s
195. Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18 (D.D.C. 2010).
196. Wall Street Hearing, supra note 189, at 57.
197. In TPG’s WaMu Deal, a New Playbook for Regulators?, DEALBOOK, Apr. 10, 2008,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/in-tpgs-wamu-deal-a-new-playbook-for-regulators/.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. These claims are made in Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
201. Debtor’s Motion for an Order Directing the Production of Documents from
Knowledgeable Parties at 6, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 14,
2009), ECF No. 1997.
202. Complaint, Wash. Mut., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., No. 1:09-cv-00533 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2009).
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corporate debts, WMI was rendered insolvent and filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection the next day in Delaware. 203 In disclosures
to the court, the company reported no secured liabilities, unsecured
liabilities of approximately $8 billion, and assets of approximately
$4.5 billion. 204 Additionally, while not formally disclosed as an
asset, WMI possessed approximately $20 billion dollars in
consolidated net operating loss carryforwards, which could be
preserved by Chapter 11 reorganization and used to offset future
income. 205 Soon after the bankruptcy filing, WMI pursued civil
claims against JPMorgan and the FDIC regarding the ownership of
certain assets, including WMB’s share of these valuable tax
attributes and $4 billion of trust securities. 206 Extensive litigation
ensued, both within and outside of bankruptcy court, among WMI
and certain of its stakeholders, JPMorgan, the FDIC and certain of
WMI’s largest creditors. 207

203. Voluntary Petition of WMI Investment Corp., In re WMI Investment Corp., No. 0812228 (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1; Voluntary Petition of Washington Mutual,
Inc., In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1. The
cases were consolidated pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) under Case No. 08-12229.
204. Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for WMI, at 10, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No.
08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2008), ECF No. 477.
205. Interim Order Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (i)
Establishing Notification Procedures and Approving Restriction on Certain Transfers of Interests
in the Debtors’ Estates, and (ii) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 0812229 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 7, 2008), ECF No. 243.
206. The FDIC ordered that $4 billion of outstanding publicly-traded trust preferred
securities issued by a special purpose entity of WMB be exchanged for preferred stock of WMI.
The trust securities were then transferred to WMB, and sold to JPMorgan as part of the assets of
WMB. This aspect of the acquisition is described in greater detail in Complaint, supra note 202
at 10-11.
207. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2010)
(discussing Washington Mutual bondholders that alleged JPMorgan tortiously interfered with
their contractual rights by engineering a campaign to distort market and regulatory perception of
Washington Mutual’s financial health); Black Horse Capital LP, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 10-51387 (Bankr. D. Del. July 6, 2010) (stating that
Washington Mutual trust-preferred securities holders allege that WMI improperly converted
their shares from debt to equity, and engaged in rampant fraud and misrepresentations with
respect to these securities); Washington Mut., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00533 (stating that WMI alleges
that the FDIC conducted the sale in an unlawful and unreasonable manner, and that the actions
of the FDIC constituted an unlawful taking); Broadbill Investment Corp. v. Washington Mut.,
Inc., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 10-50911 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 12, 2010) (finding that
holders of litigation tracking warrants relating to a $350 million judgment in favor of
Washington Mutual claim that the funds should be awarded to them, while WMI claims that the
warrants were converted to WMI common stock); Washington Mut., Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 09-50934 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (stating that WMI

795

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/6/2014 1:43 PM

2013

In March 2010, WMI reached an agreement with JPMorgan, the
FDIC, WMI’s largest creditors (referred to collectively as the
“Settlement Noteholders”), and the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors to settle outstanding lawsuits, including an
agreement to recognize JPMorgan as the owner of the $4 billion trust
securities. 208 As part of that settlement, JPMorgan would transfer to
WMI approximately $4 billion in deposit funds, free and clear of all
claims. 209 Additionally, JPMorgan would relinquish its claims on
approximately $2.5 billion in tax refunds relating to the banking
business. 210 Finally, WMI would grant releases to JPMorgan for all
claims arising out of JPMorgan’s alleged misconduct. In total, the
global settlement would enable the bankruptcy estate to distribute
approximately $7.5 billion—an amount nearly sufficient to pay
WMI’s creditors, but insufficient to provide any residual benefit to
equity security holders.211
The settlement agreement was a principal component of WMI’s
sixth amended Chapter 11 plan, which was initially filed with the
bankruptcy court in March 2010 212 and subjected to a vote by all
classes of WMI’s company’s creditors and equity security holders. 213
In some Chapter 11 cases, the debtor is able to put together a plan
that all classes vote to accept. However, WMI was not such a case.
Accordingly, WMI asked the court to confirm the sixth amended
plan over the objections of dissenting classes. 214 Courts may
exercise this power so long as certain technical requirements are
met. Chief among these is a requirement that the plan is approved by
at least one class of any claimants who are “impaired” under the

alleges that JPMorgan failed to return over $4 billion in deposit liabilities that JPMorgan owes
WMI); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Washington Mut., Inc., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No.
09-50551 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2009) (stating that JPMorgan alleges that the suit filed by
WMI against JPMorgan places in jeopardy its economic interests in the assets it acquired in the
sale).
208. See Section 2.3 of the Draft of Settlement Agreement, included as Exhibit I to the
Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D.
Del. Mar. 26, 2010).
209. Id. at Section 2.1.
210. Id. at Section 2.4.
211. Letters to Creditors, et al. from WMI (Oct. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
212. Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 26, 2010).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012).
214. The requirements are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(8).
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plan. 215 A class is considered to be impaired to the extent the plan
changes the claimant’s legal, equitable and contractual rights. 216 The
impaired classes under the sixth amended plan included equity
security holders and holders of PIERS Claims (a specific group of
WMI’s unsecured creditors). 217 Equity security holders would
receive no distributions, and PIERS claimants would recover
approximately seventy-three percent of their claims. 218 The PIERS
claimants voted to accept the sixth amended plan, while equity
security holders vehemently objected. 219
Despite the PIERS claimants’ satisfactory vote, the court was
unable to confirm the sixth amended plan because of a host of
disputes. 220 In one such dispute, the Official Committee of Equity
Security Holders (the “Equity Committee”) alleged that WMI
allowed the Settlement Noteholders to dominate the restructuring
process, steering WMI to settle claims in amounts sufficient to
enable the bankruptcy estate to satisfy only creditor claims. 221 In
particular, the Equity Committee alleged that WMI did not
adequately pursue claims against JPMorgan because the economic
benefit of any damages awarded would accrue to WMI’s equity
security holders rather than to the more powerful creditor groups. 222
Finally, the Equity Committee challenged the proposed members of

215. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10); In re Townco Realty Inc., 81 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1988).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8); 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1). Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), a
debtor may under certain circumstances “cram down” a plan notwithstanding rejection by a
creditor class.
217. The PIERS are Preferred Income Equity Redeemable Securities issued by Washington
Mutual Capital Trust 2001 (“WMCT 2001”), a special purpose trust. The only assets of WMCT
2001 are subordinated debentures issued by WMI. Thus, WMCT 2001 is a creditor of WMI, and
WMCT 2001’s beneficial owners are treated as general unsecured creditors of WMI. See PostHearing Brief of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its Capacity as Indenture Trustee and Guarantee
Trustee, in Support of Confirmation, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del.
Aug. 10, 2011), ECF No. 8414.
218. Letters to Creditors, et al. from WMI (Oct. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
219. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 212–13 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
220. In two successive opinions, the court concluded that the global settlement agreement
was fair and reasonable, but declined to confirm the plan because of other deficiencies. In re
Washington Mut., 461 B.R. 200; In re Washington Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 344–45, 365 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2011).
221. Objection of the Committee of Equity Security Holders to Confirmation of the
Modified Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229
(Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2011), ECF No. 8192.
222. See id.
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the WMI liquidating trust’s advisory board, claiming that members
were appointed by constituencies that would receive a full or nearfull recovery and therefore could not be counted upon to pursue
claims that would benefit other classes and constituencies. 223
However, one of the most heated disputes pertained to
allegations initially raised by a thirty-three-year-old equity security
holder, described by one journalist as a “day trading hipster.” 224 The
investor closely monitored the case and, in a rather unusual move,
filed his own objection to the sixth amended plan, alleging that the
plan was not proposed in good faith. 225 Specifically, he claimed that
WMI’s management breached duties of loyalty and care owed to
equity security holders by “continually act[ing] adversely to equity,
while simultaneously representing to the court . . . that equity’s
interests are adequately represented” 226 and by “work[ing] closely
with the [Settlement Noteholders] to the exclusion . . . [and]
detriment” of equity security holders. 227 He further alleged that the
plan confirmation votes of the Settlement Noteholders should be set
aside because Settlement Noteholders did not vote on the plan in
good faith 228 and that, because of these alleged defects, the plan
could not be confirmed by the court.229
The investor also asserted that the Settlement Noteholders hold
nearly seventy percent of the PIERS Claims and therefore
strategically crafted an impaired class to affirm the plan. 230 Finally,
223. See id.
224. Bess Levin, Day Trading Hipster Takes on David Tepper, DEALBREAKER (June 13, 2011),
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/06/day-trading-hipster-takes-on-david-tepper/.
225. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, filed by Nate Thoma, In re Washington Mut.,
Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2010), ECF No. 6058. The objection alleges that the
plan violates 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
226. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225, at 1.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e), “[o]n request of a party in interest . . . the court may
designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not
solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title.” In addition,
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (d) provides that the vote of any entity designated by the bankruptcy court
is to be excluded in assessing whether the requisite majorities for class acceptance have been
achieved.
229. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225, at 4.
230. Id. The investor alleged that the Settlement Noteholders engaged in “class
gerrymandering,” which has been a contentious issue in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Machne
Menachem, Inc., 233 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that a plan will be rendered
unconfirmable “by the impermissible gerrymandering of classes,” since “vote manipulation by
the gerrymandering of classes seriously undermines the critical requirements set out in Section
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he claimed that Settlement Noteholders traded extensively in debt
securities of WMI throughout the pendency of the case, despite
possession of material, non-public information obtained during
negotiations. 231 Based upon the allegations raised by the investor,
the Equity Committee subsequently filed a motion to conduct an
examination of the Settlement Noteholders.232 In February 2011, the
Court granted the Equity Committee’s request, permitting a limited
examination of the Settlement Noteholders. 233
The investor’s bold attempts to influence the proceedings were
met with significant opposition. One of the Settlement Noteholders,
a hedge fund that invests with a focus on distressed debt, served a
reciprocal examination request upon the individual investor. 234 The
request for production, which was prepared by one of the nation’s
largest commercial law firms and served upon the investor at his
uncle’s apartment, demanded access to “[a]ll documents or
communications concerning and/or reflecting communications
between [the investor] and the Equity Committee . . . [and] any
other person relating to [the] Objection and/or subsequent proffers
to the Court” and “all documents and communications sufficient to
reflect . . . past or present holdings in any securities of the
Debtors.” 235 When timely responses from the investor were not
received, the hedge fund moved for an order compelling him to
produce documents and respond to interrogatories. 236
1129(a)(8)”).
231. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225.
232. Motion of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders for an Order Pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the Examination of the
Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2011), ECF No. 6567. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 authorizes examinations
of this sort.
233. Order Granting, in Part, Motion of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders
for an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the
Examination of the Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders Group, In re Washington
Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 2011), ECF No. 6725.
234. Objection of Appaloosa Management L.P. to the Motion of the Equity Committee for
an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the
Examination of the Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders Group at 17, In re
Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 6645.
235. Appaloosa Management L.P.’s First Request for Production of Documents to Nate
Thoma at 4–5, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF
No. 6887.
236. Motion of Appaloosa Management L.P. for an Order Compelling Nate Thoma to
Search for and Produce Documents and to Respond to Interrogatory Requests, In re Washington
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Struggling to overcome substantial collective action obstacles,
equity security holders from around the world rallied in the private
investor’s defense. Approximately one hundred and eighty individual
investors, mostly from Europe, flooded the court with objections to
the hedge fund’s motion. 237 One such objection asserts that,
pursuant to an “exceptionally questionable motion,” the hedge fund
“intends to proceed against a small investor and examine him.” 238
The objection further argues that “instead of initiating a parallel,
senseless examination of a small, private investor, the [Settlement
Noteholders] should . . . provide the requested documents to the
Equity Committee.” 239 Finally, at least one objection notes the
hardship imposed by the hedge fund’s demands, given that the
investor is not receiving reimbursement from the debtor’s estate of
expenses and attorneys’ fees. 240
In July 2011, the Equity Committee filed an additional objection
to the sixth amended plan, further asserting that Settlement
Noteholders traded in WMI securities on the basis of material,
nonpublic information and arguing that the Settlement Noteholders
“hijacked” negotiations and controlled WMI during the bankruptcy
process. 241 In September 2011, after several hearings, the court
refused to confirm the sixth amended plan, citing a number of
defects. 242 The court found that the equity security holders had a
colorable claim of insider trading, and granted a motion authorizing

Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 19, 2011), ECF No. 7160.
237. See In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del) (reflecting the
objections on the docket).
238. Objection of Thomas Dresel to the Motion of Appaloosa Management L.P. (cf. Docket
Number 7160) for an Order Compelling Mr. Nate Thoma to Search for and Produce Documents
and to Respond to Interrogatory Requests and as Consequence of it [sic] Motion for (a)
Allowance for Mr. Thoma of Reimbursement for all Costs in this Matter (b) Trading Restrictions
for all Parties, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 27, 2011), ECF
No. 7197.
239. Id. at 2.
240. Id. at 4.
241. Objection of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders to Confirmation of the
Modified Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229
(Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8073. This is not the first time a claim of insider trading
has been made in a bankruptcy case. For instance, a creditor was accused of trading on the basis
of material, nonpublic information gained from its service on a committee in In re Galey & Lord,
Ch. 7 Case No. 04-43098 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2004).
242. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 267 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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the Equity Committee to pursue the claim. 243 However, “concerned
that the case [would] devolve into a litigation morass” and citing the
potential economic futility of prosecuting the claim of insider
trading, the court ordered the parties to engage in mediation to
resolve lingering disputes.244
In December 2011, the Debtors announced that the mediation
had been successful and that a newly proposed seventh amended
Chapter 11 plan contained a global settlement of all outstanding
claims, including those of the equity security holders. 245 Under the
new plan, the Settlement Noteholders would contribute $75 million
to the reorganized WMI. 246 Holders of WMI’s common stock would
receive their pro rata share of twenty-five percent of the equity of the
new company, while holders of WMI’s preferred stock would receive
their pro rata share of seventy-five percent of the new company. 247
The plan also included releases from the equity securities holders,
J.P. Morgan, and the FDIC of all legal claims. 248 The court confirmed
the seventh amended plan in February 2012.249

B. The General Growth Chapter 11 Case
Originally formed in 1954 to operate a single retail property in
Iowa, the Chicago-based retail mall owner General Growth
Properties, Inc., a publicly-traded real estate investment trust,
steadily grew to become one of the nation’s largest retail mall
owners. 250 General Growth featured a multi-tiered corporate
243. Id. at 254–67.
244. Id. at 267.
245. Motion of Debtors for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105, 502, 1125 and 1128 of the
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 3003, 3017, 3018, 3019, 3020, and 9006, (I)
Approving the Proposed Disclosure Statement and the Form and Manner of the Notice of the
Proposed Disclosure Statement Hearing, (II) Establishing Solicitation and Voting Procedures,
(III) Scheduling a Confirmation Hearing, and (IV) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures
for Confirmation of the Debtors’ Seventh Amended Plan, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 0812229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 13, 2011), ECF No. 9181.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); see also Peg
Brickley, WaMu Bankruptcy Plan Advances, WALL ST. J.
(Feb.
17,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577229153649046724.html.
250. Iliana Jonas & Emily Chasan, General Growth files historic real estate bankruptcy, REUTERS
(April 16, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/16/us-generalgrowth-bankruptcyidUSLG52607220090416.
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structure, with certain assets and liabilities titled in upper-level
holding companies, 251 and the balance of assets and liabilities titled
in hundreds of bankruptcy remote “special-purpose entities”
(“SPEs”). The parent company (“GGP”) was publicly-traded. 252
Across a complex corporate structure, the company held a large
amount of debt secured primarily by commercial real estate. As real
estate values plummeted in 2007 and 2008, the company’s debt-toasset ratios became a source for concern. 253 As of December 31,
2008, General Growth reported nearly $30 billion in assets and just
over $27 billion in liabilities. 254 At that time, approximately $25
billion of General Growth’s liabilities pertained to debt
instruments. 255 Of this amount, approximately $18 billion consisted
of mortgages on the SPEs’ property, and nearly $7 billion consisted
of unsecured corporate-level debt.256
In better economic times, the company managed cash flow by
regularly obtaining mortgage loans secured by the SPEs’ properties,
structured with medium-term maturities and balloon payments. 257
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and recession,
General Growth found it increasingly difficult to obtain mortgage
loans with acceptable terms. When installment payments on its
corporate debt and approximately $15 billion of mortgage loans
came due in 2009, 258 the company found itself in default of its
obligations. 259 Making matters worse, the company was unable to

251. GGP’s “corporate-level” debt is in fact held by a number of upper-tier holding
companies.
252. Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., The Buck’s Rebound Begins Here,
Presentation at Ira Sohn Conference, May 29, 2009.
253. General Growth’s business suffered from the bursting of the real estate bubble and
the subsequent global recession. See supra note 178, and source cited therein.
254. General Growth Properties, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2008).
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
258. See Kris Hudson, General Growth Switches Its Bankruptcy Counsel, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123111371319952447.html (detailing the company’s
struggles); Kelly Johnson, General Growth Reports $1.2B in Overdue Debt, PAC. BUS. NEWS (Feb. 24,
2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2009/02/23/daily26.html?page=all.
259. Iliana Jonas, General Growth Says Has Defaulted on Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/21/generalgrowth-idINN2050986920090221?rpc=44
(describing the termination of a forbearance agreement and the resultant cross-default of
corporate debt).
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refinance or sell assets to generate cash flow. 260
In what would later be dubbed “one of the biggest commercial
real estate collapses in United States history,” 261 General Growth
commenced its restructuring process via protracted, out-of-court
negotiations. GGP and its corporate-level lenders spent seven
months trying to reach a deal. 262 When lenders refused to consent to
GGP’s proposed out-of-court restructuring, 263 the company and
hundreds of its project-level affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in waves commencing in April 2009. 264
The decision to file for bankruptcy was strongly encouraged by a
new, dominant stakeholder in GGP. In the months leading up to the
bankruptcy filing, a hedge fund known for taking activist positions in
distressed companies acquired interests amounting to nearly 25% of
legal and beneficial ownership of GGP, including the largest (7.5%)
stake in the company’s publicly-traded equity security interests. The
hedge fund also held approximately $225 million of GGP’s
corporate-level debt, $177 million of which was acquired for
approximately thirty cents on the dollar. 265
Additionally, in contemplation of the bankruptcy filing, the
hedge fund sought to become GGP’s debtor-in-possession financing
lender, 266 and received a $15 million payment for its commitment to

260. David Roeder, Mall Owner Mauled by Debt, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009.
261. Michael J. de la Merced, General Growth Properties Files for Bankruptcy, DEALBOOK (Apr.
16,
2009),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/general-growth-properties-files-forbankruptcy/.
262. Daniel Taub & Brian Louis, General Growth Files Biggest U.S. Property Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
anaZwxRpYcTw.
263. Ilaina Jonas, General Growth Fails to Win Bondholder Support, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/30/us-generalgrowth-idINTRE52T4FV20090330.
264. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition of General Growth Properties, Inc., In re Gen. Growth
Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 1. Pursuant to FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1015(b), the cases were consolidated for procedural purposes under Case No. 0911977.
265. Dan Wilchins, Ackman Bets General Growth is Fundamentally Healthy, REUTERS (Apr. 16,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/16/us-generalgrowth-ackman-interview-sbidUSTRE53F7EH20090416.
266. The prospective debtor-in-possession financing arrangement was announced by GGP
on the same day that it announced its bankruptcy filing, thereby strongly suggesting that the
debtor and the hedge fund had been working together to develop the debtor’s Chapter 11
strategy. See Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties, Inc. Files
for Chapter 11 Protection; Broken Credit Markets Require GGP to Reduce and Restructure Debt (Apr. 16,
2009), available at http://investor.ggp.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=377629.
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lend $375 million to the company on terms that included interest at
a rate equal to LIBOR plus 12% and warrants to buy 4.9% of a
reorganized GGP. 267 These expensive loan terms do not necessarily
reflect the risk of default; with court approval, debtor-in-possession
financing arrangements receive a priming lien that effectively
ensures repayment.268
However, just before the hearing to consider the proposal, the
debtor entertained additional financing proposals from other related
parties. 269 At the hearing, the hedge fund, through its attorney,
pushed to obtain the financing deal: “We made dramatic concessions
to get to where we are today . . . . We expect the debtors to live by
the rules.” 270 Notwithstanding these efforts, the court ultimately
approved a financing deal from a group of lenders that included
certain of GGP’s unsecured creditors. 271 The approved debtor-inpossession financing contained substantially similar terms, except
that the lenders would not receive stock warrants.272
Following the loss of the financing deal, the hedge fund’s
manager began lobbying for a position on the company’s board of
directors, 273 and was elected to the board in late May 2009. 274 The
hedge fund also lobbied on the company’s behalf on Wall Street. In
presentations to investors and Wall Street analysts, the fund’s
manager asserted that GGP’s publicly-traded common stock was
worth substantially more than its trading range. 275 In the May 2009
267. Ilaina Jonas, U.S. Judge OKs Bankruptcy Loan for General Growth, REUTERS (May 13,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/generalgrowth-idUSN1343594820090513.
268. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (2012).
269. Helen Chernikoff, General Growth Bankruptcy Financing Hearing Delayed, ALIBABA.COM
(May 10, 2009), http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/markets/100099552-1-update-2-generalgrowth-bankruptcy-financing.html
270. Id.
271. Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties, Inc.
13,
2009),
available at
Announces Court Approval of DIP Financing (May
http://investor.ggp.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=383933.
272. Kris Hudson, General Growth Returns to Farallon for Bankruptcy Financing, WALL ST. J.
(May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124215538672711783.html.
273. See, e.g., Ackman Expects to Join General Growth Board, DEALBOOK (Mar. 17, 2009),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/ackman-expects-to-join-general-growth-board/;
Zachery Kouwe, A Hedge Fund Manager Wins and Moves On, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/business/economy/17ackman.html.
274. Nick Zieminski, Bill Ackman Appointed to General Growth Board, REUTERS (Jun. 8,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/08/generalgrowth-ackman-idUSN08305700
20090608.
275. Daniel Taub, General Growth Bidding War Looms After Simon Offer, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
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presentation, the manager argued that conditions were ripe for
substantial growth in the value of equity security interests during
the pendency of, and immediately following, the Chapter 11
reorganization. 276 Among the many factors supporting this
assertion, the fund’s manager noted the fund’s dual status as a
director and investor, characterizing its role as that of a “shareholder
advocate.” 277
It was perhaps the advocacy of this dominant shareholder that
enabled the company to advance an aggressive restructuring plan
that turned upon a creative exercise of contract interpretation. 278
The company’s hundreds of SPEs were, by definition, originally
structured as bankruptcy remote. These SPEs had been created to
own individual commercial real estate properties in the company’s
portfolio, most of which secured mortgage loans. 279 Since many of
these mortgage loans were sold to third-party investors in the form
of commercial mortgage-backed securities, ratings firms required
that each SPE contractually promise (in its governing documents as
well as in corresponding debt instruments) to limit operations in
ways that would make the likelihood of bankruptcy remote. 280
In particular, the governing documents of the SPEs required
unanimous consent of each SPE’s managers, including two
independent managers, before the SPE could ever file for
bankruptcy. 281 The independent managers were required to
“consider only the interests of the Company, including its respective
creditors, in acting or otherwise voting on” a bankruptcy filing. 282
Finally, most of the agreements provided that the independent
managers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care similar to that of a

17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMGHfJgIIeRI.
276. Pershing Square Conference Presentation, supra note 252, at 26–30.
277. Id. at 30.
278. Press Release, AlixPartners, AlixPartners Honored by the Turnaround Management
Association for its Work at General Growth Properties and Neff Rental (Oct. 10, 2011) (“[A] strategy
of sequencing negotiations was . . . employed to establish certainty around [GGP’s] ability to
reorganize and retain properties with acceptable financing terms on a bottom-up basis within
the organizational structure.”).
279. Amended Brief of Amici Curiae with Respect to the Filing of Voluntary Petitions in
Bankruptcy by the Individual Property Owner Subsidiaries, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No.
09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009), ECF No. 289.
280. Id. at 7 (describing the “twin components of asset isolation”).
281. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
282. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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director of a corporation organized under Delaware law. 283
Just prior to the General Growth bankruptcy filing,
approximately 159 of the independent managers were terminated
from the boards of their respective SPEs, and new independent
managers were appointed. 284 The newly appointed independent
managers consented to the SPE bankruptcy filings; in many cases,
the former independent managers were not even aware of their
termination until after the bankruptcy filing. 285
Not surprisingly, the SPEs’ bankruptcy petitions were met with
strong objections from their mortgage lenders. 286 These secured
creditors filed motions to dismiss the SPEs’ bankruptcy cases,
arguing that the SPEs were not financially distressed and had filed
for bankruptcy solely to benefit GGP in a manner detrimental to the
SPEs’ mortgage lenders. 287 Attempting to assist the SPEs’ secured
creditors via an amicus brief, an attorney representing the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association characterized the SPE
bankruptcies as “GGP’s attempt to ignore organizational
formalities.” 288
However, the bankruptcy court approved the SPEs’ Chapter 11
petitions, finding that the secured creditors had not demonstrated
objective futility of the filings. 289 Specifically, the court rejected the
secured creditors’ argument that the question of whether a filing is
made in good faith should be viewed only from each individual
debtor’s perspective.290 Instead, the court looked to the interests of
the enterprise as a whole, finding that a subsidiary may be included
in the bankruptcy of its parent regardless of the financial health of
283. Id.
284. Id. at 67–68.
285. See id.
286. Mark S. Edelstein, et. al., Bad Boy Guaranty Update: Lenders on a Winning Streak, in Real
Estate Weekly (Mar. 3, 2010), at 285–86 (PLI Negotiating Real Estate Deals, Course Handbook
Ser. No. N-591, 2011) (exploring bankruptcy remote entities as credit enhancements).
287. See, e.g., Motion of ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112(b), to Dismiss the Cases of Bakersfield Mall, LLC, RASCCAP Realty, Ltd.; Visalia Mall,
L.P.; GGP-Tucson Mall L.L.C.; Lancaster Trust; HO Retail Properties II Limited Partnership; RS
Properties Inc.; Stonestown Shopping Center L.P.; and Fashion Place, LLC, Amended Brief of
Amici Curiae with Respect to the Filing of Voluntary Petitions in Bankruptcy by the Individual
Property Owner Subsidiaries, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2009), ECF No. 334.
288. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 279, at 19.
289. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
290. Id. at 69–70.
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the subsidiary. 291
What is more, with respect to the SPEs’ independent managers,
the court found that the termination, while “admittedly
surreptitious,” was not indicative of subjective bad faith on the part
of the debtors sufficient to require dismissal of the bankruptcy
cases. 292 The court applied the reasoning of Delaware cases,
asserting that directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders. 293 Thus, the
independent managers could lawfully approve the bankruptcy filings
notwithstanding the entities’ bankruptcy remote status, since the
decision to file for bankruptcy was made at a time when each SPE
was a solvent corporation and the decision was in the best interests
of GGP as shareholder. 294
Finally, GGP requested authorization to use rents collected from
the SPEs’ mall tenants. 295 Although these rents constituted the
secured creditors’ cash collateral, 296 GGP argued that access to this
cash flow was necessary to enable the company to continue its
business operations. 297 The SPE lenders objected, claiming that it
would violate principles of legal separateness for GGP to “upstream
cash from the individual properties for use at the parent-level
entity.” 298 In granting GGP’s request to use the cash, the court ruled
that the company may upstream cash “at a time it was needed most
by the Group,” and that the SPE lenders would receive adequate
protection in exchange for permitting GGP to use the cash

291. See id.
292. Id. at 68.
293. Id. at 64–65.
294. Id.
295. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 55; see also Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final
Orders Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), 363(c) and 364(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules 6003 and 6004 (a) for Authorization to (I) Continue Using Existing
Centralized Cash Management System (II) Honor Certain Prepetition Obligations Related to the
Use of the Cash Management System, and (III) Maintain Existing Bank Accounts and Business
Forms; (B) for An Extension of Time to Comply with Section 345(b) of the Bankruptcy Code;
and (C) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 8.
296. Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(a), “cash collateral” includes cash, cash equivalents, proceeds
and accounts receivable. A debtor is prohibited from using cash collateral without a secured
lender’s consent or a court order authorizing the debtor’s use. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012).
297. See supra note 295 and sources cited therein.
298. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 55.
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collateral. 299
With the SPEs safely in bankruptcy and GGP authorized to use
the SPEs’ rental income, SPE creditors were highly incentivized to
agree to a restructuring of the mortgage loans. By February 2010,
General Growth completed negotiations with 231 of the SPE
creditors. 300 In most cases, the restructuring entailed a modification
of loan terms, including extension of the maturity date. 301
As General Growth’s SPE-level debt burdens were gradually
alleviated via the SPE restructurings, focus shifted to restructuring
GGP’s corporate-level debt and planning the parent company’s
reemergence from bankruptcy. To this end, the company explored
strategic opportunities, such as a sale of the entire company. 302
General Growth received an unsolicited acquisition offer from its
competitor, retail mall operator Simon Property Group
(“Simon”). 303 Pursuant to the offer, all corporate-level creditors
would be paid in full and equity security holders would receive
approximately $9 per share. 304 GGP rejected the offer, citing a desire
to explore all strategic options. 305 In the days following Simon’s bid,

299. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), (e).
300. General Growth Properties, Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 1, 2010).
301. See, e.g., Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties
Announces Bankruptcy Court Confirmation of Plans of Reorganization for Approximately
$10.25 Billion of Secured Mortgage Loans (Dec. 15,
2009), available at
http://www.ggp.com/about-ggp/press-releases/general-growth-properties-announcesbankruptcy-court-confirmation-of-plans-of-reorganization-for; Press Release, General Growth
Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties Reaches Agreement in Principle on Certain
Mortgage Related Debt (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://investor.ggp.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=425484.
302. See Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties
Announces Next Steps in Restructuring Process (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20091217005359/en/General-Growth-PropertiesAnnounces-Steps-Restructuring-Process (“[T]he Board of Directors and management are
considering all indications of interest in the Company.”).
303. Michael J. de la Merced, With Big Takeover Bid, Simon Aims to Control 30% of U.S. Malls,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/business/17mall.html; see
also Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties Responds To
Simon Property Group and Reaffirms Bankruptcy Emergence Process (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100216007615/en/General-Growth-PropertiesResponds-Simon-Property-Group.
304. Taub, supra note 275.
305. Press Release, supra note 303 (quoting GGP’s letter to Simon: “We and our board of
directors have given considerable thought to your indication of interest and have concluded
based on discussions with other interested parties that it is not sufficient to preempt the process
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GGP’s stock price soared. 306 Wall Street analysts reiterated positive
ratings on the bankrupt company, citing a belief that “management
will do what maximizes the value for its shareholders.” 307
In the months that followed, Simon revised its bid and lobbied
for support among GGP’s stakeholders. 308 GGP’s unsecured
creditors backed the proposal, alleging that the General Growth
restructuring was mired by conflicts of interest caused by the hedge
fund’s position as a director of the company, a dominant creditor,
and its largest equity security holder. 309 In a motion filed in the
bankruptcy court, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
(the “Unsecured Creditors Committee”) expressed its concern that
the debtors were “attempting to . . . force upon their creditors a
lengthy and uncertain Capital Raise/M&A Process, rather than
pursue a transaction that would guarantee . . . creditors . . . cash
payment in full and provide . . . equity holders with a substantial
distribution.” 310 What is more, the Unsecured Creditors Committee
accused the debtors of “ignoring their fiduciary duty to creditors
by . . . pursu[ing] a Capital Raise/M&A Process designed solely to
benefit equity holders at great risk to creditors’ recoveries.” 311 The
Unsecured Creditors Committee expressed a preference for the
Simon offer because it would provide a timely and more certain cash
recovery; in contrast, the pursuit of other strategic alternatives
would bring delays, risks, uncertainty and substantial transaction
costs. 312 In addition, the Unsecured Creditors Committee accused

we are undertaking to explore all avenues to emerge from Chapter 11 and maximize value for all
the Company’s stakeholders.”).
306. Kris Hudson, Simon Offers $10 Billion for General Growth, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804204575069081644845898.html
(“Investors expect a sweetened bid from either Simon or from any competing plan General
Growth offers for its exit from bankruptcy. On Tuesday they pushed General Growth’s stock up
$2.62 to $12.02—more than $3 above the offer price—in 4 p.m. trading on the so-called Pink
Sheets electronic trading system.”).
307. Id.
308. Barton Eckert, Simon Property Enhances Bid for General Growth Properties, WASH. BUS. J.
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2010/04/19/daily81.html.
309. See infra note 310 and source cited therein.
310. Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’ Motion
Pursuant to Section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code Requesting a Second Extension of
Exclusive Periods for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Solicitation of Acceptances Thereto at 2, In re
Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010), ECF No. 4486.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 4–6.
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the debtors of attempting to “inflate value for their equity holders”
by raising, through strategic alternatives, “only the minimum
amount of capital needed to achieve . . . emergence from chapter
11 and to equitize large portions of [corporate level] unsecured debt
at an artificially high equity value.” 313
In essence, the Unsecured Creditors Committee accused the
company’s dominant equity security holders—and in particular, the
hedge fund—of controlling General Growth’s bankruptcy and
engaging in dilatory measures in the hopes of benefiting equity at
the potential expense of creditors. 314 Indeed, neither GGP nor the
hedge fund ever expressly denied delaying the company’s exit from
bankruptcy; for instance, in its motion for an extension, GGP noted
that it could not yet file a Chapter 11 plan because it needed to give
“the marketplace . . . an opportunity to fairly value General
Growth’s enterprise.” 315
In May 2010, Simon made a “last-ditch offer” valued at
approximately $20 per share. 316 GGP avoided Simon’s bid by
entering into a stalking horse arrangement for approximately $10.50
per share, also granting Pershing Square and several other investors
warrants worth approximately $688 million to acquire stock in the
reorganized company in exchange for financing. 317 In October 2010,
GGP advanced a Chapter 11 plan that was accepted by majorities in
all classes entitled to vote. Under the plan, all creditor claims would
be satisfied, equity security holders would receive approximately $15
per share, and the company would be recapitalized pursuant to an
equity infusion of $7 to $8.5 billion. 318 In accordance with the plan,
GGP exited bankruptcy in November 2010 and followed through
with a proposed split of the company into two separate, publicly-

313. Id. at 5.
314. Id. at 20–21.
315. Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code Requesting a
Second Extension of Exclusive Periods for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Soliciting Acceptances
Thereto at 2, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010), ECF
No. 4296.
316. Robert Carr, Court Agreement Ends GGP Bankruptcy Bid Battle, AMLAW DAILY (May 7,
2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202457889043&Court_Agreement_Ends_
General_Growth_Bankruptcy_Bid_Battle.
317. Tiffany Kary & Daniel Taub, General Growth Wins Court Approval of Brookfield-Led Bid
Over Simon Offer, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0507/general-growth-wins-court-approval-of-brookfield-led-bid-over-simon-offer.html.
318. Press Release, supra note 278.
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traded companies. 319 The hedge fund’s manager was appointed
chairman of one of the spinoff companies. 320

C. Insights Gained from the New Explanatory Model
A central claim of this Article is that a broader explanatory
model, drawing on the analytical tools of modern political economy,
allows thicker narratives of Chapter 11 negotiations. Examining the
two case studies under this alternative framework, it appears that
the outcomes of Chapter 11 cases are very much driven by internal
dynamics. These dynamics, which take place beyond the myopic view
of the unitary actor model, undercut the persistent claim that
negotiated Chapter 11 outcomes yield fair and efficient resolutions
of corporate financial distress. And as the current bankruptcy
process relies on such an Efficiency Fallacy, our judicial approach to
Chapter 11 stands in stark need of reform.
As a preliminary matter, the case studies reveal some
shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory as a foundation of
commercial bankruptcy law. In particular, the model’s persistent
unitary actor construct is inadequate when applied to complex
organizations. For instance, in the Washington Mutual restructuring,
it is misleading to conceptualize the debtor as the same deliberate,
rational actor that previously led a successful business enterprise.
Prior to the FDIC’s sale of the bank to JPMorgan, Washington
Mutual was a family of business entities with an extensive
infrastructure to oversee a large banking and investment business. 321
In contrast, during the Chapter 11 case, Washington Mutual was a
decimated corporate shell, with negotiations largely handled on its

319. A new company was formed to own indirectly substantially all of the equity of
reorganized GGP. Another new company, The Howard Hughes Corporation, was formed to hold
a portfolio of developing properties. Id. at 2; see also Daniel J. Sernovitz, Park Meadows Owner
General Growth Properties Exits Bankruptcy, DENVER BUS. J. (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:09 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2010/11/10/general-growth.html.
320. Adam Castiglioni, Faneuil Hall Operator Out of Ch. 11, BOSTON HERALD (Nov. 10,
2010), http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view.bg?articleid=1295271.
321. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 176, at 1.
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behalf by dominant creditors. Similar recognition must be made as to
purportedly unitary classes of “creditors” and “equity security
holders.” For instance, in the WMI restructuring, the Settlement
Noteholders assumed a dominant position among “creditors”;
likewise, in the GGP restructuring, a hedge fund assumed a
dominant position among “equity security holders.”
Having identified some of the individuals and pressure groups
driving collective action in the two case studies, the new explanatory
model next invites us to identify the economic decision-making
preferences of such persons. In the WMI restructuring, dominant
creditors clearly sought full satisfaction of their claims. At a
minimum, full satisfaction would make the creditors whole.
However, to the extent individual creditors purchased their claims
on the secondary market for less than face value, full satisfaction
would enable them to profit from the restructuring. In contrast, in
their secondary role as PIERS claimants, the dominant creditors did
not desire full satisfaction of claims, but rather sought some degree
of impairment sufficient to meet statutory requirements for plan
approval. 322 What is more, it is important to note that these
dominant creditors had no economic incentive to advance a
restructuring outcome that would increase the bankruptcy estate
beyond the face value of all unimpaired creditor claims—particularly
if such an outcome would require protracted litigation, delays, and
uncertainties.
In contrast, in the General Growth restructuring, a hedge fund
that specialized in distressed company investing sought to take
advantage of the full upside potential of its equity security
investments. In an effort to obtain formal authority to act on behalf
of the debtor, the fund’s manager increased its equity share, sought
and obtained a seat on the board of directors, and attempted to
become the company’s debtor-in-possession lender. The hedge
fund’s desire to realize GGP’s full upside potential steered the
restructuring away from the more immediate Simon offer, towards
less certain outcomes that had the potential to generate higher longterm profits. Although the fund’s profit maximization goals were to
some extent correlated with the profit maximization goals of other

322. Of course, given that the dominant creditors allegedly acquired PIERS claims on the
secondary market, it is possible that they would achieve a profit even from partial satisfaction of
the face value.
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equity security holders, the fund’s investments in the debtor also
included substantial debt positions, a position on the board of
directors, a prospective position as the debtor-in-possession lender,
and a prospective position as a large stakeholder in a postbankruptcy spinoff company. Thus, while the ultimate restructuring
outcome may have been beneficial to all equity security holders, it
also included components that would only benefit certain equity
security holders.
As collective action principles suggest, organizational actors that
represent more concentrated constituents and operate with clear
authority can be expected to take more decisive steps in
restructurings. Thus, the FDIC, acting under a statutory grant of
complete authority, was able to rapidly coordinate the sale of WMB
to JPMorgan to avoid depletion of its Deposit Insurance Fund. 323
The FDIC accomplished this task without the need to negotiate with
Washington Mutual’s stakeholders and without reference to “an
idealized value . . . that . . . would arise if a perfect market were
at work.” 324 Indeed, there appear to have been minimal market
checks on the sale. Similarly, the Settlement Noteholders were able
to rise to a position of dominance in the Washington Mutual
restructuring because they were similarly situated hedge funds
holding large shares of corporate-level debts. In contrast, WMI’s
equity security holders were widely dispersed, and although they
eventually mobilized, their coalition-building process was much
slower and required bold action and even personal exposure to reach
the level of influence that other persons enjoyed from the very
beginning.
Having identified the profit maximization goals of these
dominant individuals and pressure groups, we can better understand
the effect of these interests on the Chapter 11 case outcomes. In the
Washington Mutual restructuring, the Settlement Noteholders
sought to advance their own profit maximization goals related to
debt and equity investments made immediately before and during
WMI’s bankruptcy. After a lengthy battle, the Settlement
Noteholders offered a modest settlement to equity security holders
in an effort to obtain their buy-in to the Chapter 11 plan. Similarly,
in the General Growth restructuring, a hedge fund with a dominant

323. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
324. Roe, supra note 34, at 530.
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equity stake pushed to obtain a restructuring outcome that secured
maximum returns on equity investments.
The new explanatory model also allows us to more readily
identify potential economic rents. In the Washington Mutual
restructuring, dominant creditors allegedly used information
asymmetries to profit from insider trading in the debtor’s securities,
extracting economic rents from other, less knowledgeable traders in
the securities market. Similarly, in the General Growth
restructuring, dominant equity security holders arguably extracted
economic rents from other constituents in the form of additional
equity conversions as well as a large commitment fee for debtor-inpossession financing. 325
In essence, the new explanatory model offers a different account
of negotiated outcomes in Chapter 11, which stands in contrast to
the account provided by neoclassical economic theory. Consistent
with the early criticisms of Chapter 11, rather than reflecting the
price equilibrium of a competitive market, outcomes continue to
reflect the successful occupation of large organizational actors by
certain dominant individuals and pressure groups, who seek to
advance their own profit maximization goals. 326
What is more, it appears from the case studies that when these
individuals and pressure groups obtain control of large
organizational actors, they do not in fact rely upon negotiation to
reach restructuring outcomes. Somewhat counter intuitively, it
appears that dominant interests strategically use Chapter 11 to
overturn the customary commercial expectations of less powerful
parties. For instance, in the Washington Mutual restructuring, rather
than seek to negotiate with equity security holders, dominant
creditors initially sought to utilize the legal process to discourage
and stifle their efforts. Similar challenges were faced by General
Growth’s mortgage lenders, whose claims were dispersed across
hundreds of SPE entities; indeed, dominant equity security holders
successfully used Chapter 11 to interfere with the SPE lenders’

325. And, as hinted by strong advocacy efforts to obtain the debtor-in-possession financing
deal, these dominant interests also sought rents in the form of high rates of interest and
additional loan fees—common features of debtor-in-possession financings arranged by insiders.
326. Themes of this sort are explored empirically in Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R.
Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009)
(examining data on 153 large companies’ Chapter 11 cases to show that creditors largely control
Chapter 11 restructurings and that such control distorts the efficiency of case outcomes).
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customary commercial expectations with respect to SPE covenants
they previously agreed upon in routine mortgage securitization
transactions. Taken together, these observations not only reaffirm
the early criticisms of Chapter 11, but also reveal new insights about
commercial restructurings that were previously omitted from the
narratives that shape law and policy. For one thing, the case studies
suggest that the Chapter 11 process favors powerful actors, 327 such
as hedge funds acting under streamlined management by charismatic
leaders, and governmental agencies operating under strong statutory
grants of power.
And, most provocatively, the case studies suggest that against
this backdrop, market mechanisms are used by those with existing
“market power” 328 in the securities and capital markets to gain a
considerable advantage in negotiations. Specifically, these actors use
their existing market power to take extraordinary predicate measures
to enhance their bargaining power or gain increased control over
restructuring outcomes. For instance, such persons may strategically
acquire additional interests in (or claims against) the debtor via the
debt and securities markets, or exert pressure to gain managerial
control over the debtor to steer prospective financing or acquisition
deals. 329
Even more damning to the Efficiency Fallacy and the modern
faith in market mechanisms, the case studies suggest that actors are
able to utilize market power to engage in opportunistic and
327. Such parties are reminiscent of the cartels that are the focus of antitrust law.
328. Market power is the ability of a market participant to alter market prices—typically
above competitive levels. In a perfectly competitive market, no participant has this power.
Participants gain market power by controlling a dominant share of the market. For instance, in a
monopoly, a single participant controls the entire market and thus enjoys market power.
Similarly, participants in a highly concentrated market may enjoy market power where there are
significant barriers to entry for prospective competitors. See Massimiliano Vatiero, An
Institutionalist Explanation of Market Dominances, 32 L. & ECON. REV. 221 (2009).
329. See generally Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2008). For examples of these
phenomena, see Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Names Directors; No Board Seat for CEO, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
4,
2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870329400457451383224123
1354.html (describing the post-Chapter 11 bankruptcy overhaul of Delphi Automotive LLP
orchestrated by General Motors Co. and dominant lenders); Simeon Gold & Daniel Holzman,
Shopping for Distressed Companies, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 42 (2008) (describing strategic
purchases of claims against the debtor in commercial bankruptcies); see also Nathan Bomey,
Hedge Funds Seeking to Capitalize on Detroit’s Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 25, 2013),
http://www.freep.com/article/20130825/NEWS01/308250060/Detroit-bankruptcy-hedgefunds-investors (noting similar behavior by hedge funds in a recent municipal bankruptcy).
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anticompetitive tactics during the course of the restructuring. For
instance, in both case studies, surreptitious efforts were made to
reconfigure the boards of various organizational actors so that they
would serve the needs of dominant individuals and pressure groups.
Similarly, dominant creditors in the Washington Mutual case study
may have engaged in “class gerrymandering” to ensure that a plan
advancing their profit maximization goals would achieve requisite
approvals. 330 In each example, dominant interests utilized their
existing market power to effectively curtail any genuine market
clearinghouse function that might exist for control of organizational
actors or of the restructuring generally. In this way, dominant
stakeholders are able to essentially operate as a cartel, colluding to
restrict access to, and raise the price of, restructuring outcomes.
Such steps are taken to maximize individual profits and extract
rents.
What is more, by these inefficiencies, Chapter 11 carries
tremendous deadweight and opportunity costs, as parties divert
productive resources away from market activity and instead focus
such resources on gaining control of the restructuring and extracting
rents. 331 The market failure is aided by a legal construct that grants
structural privileges to large, organizational actors and those
stakeholders who can use their existing market power to gain
control. Thus, far from being a competitive environment, commercial
restructurings under Chapter 11 may have more in common with
monopolistic environments.
As political economists have argued for decades, hierarchy,
authority to act on behalf of others, and the exercise of power all
create inefficiencies. 332 Once analyzed under the new explanatory
model, Chapter 11 evidences these concerns, as both its consensusand market-based processes appear to be mired by self-dealing,
conflicts of interest,333 and information asymmetries. 334 More to the
330. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
331. These themes are explored in Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the RentSeeking Society, AM. ECON. REV., June 1974, at 291; Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
332. CARSON, supra note 143, at 2–3.
333. Conflicts of interest are common in corporate reorganizations. In a recent empirical
study, a “majority of professionals and [creditors’] committee members reported being involved
in cases where . . . a member of the committee possessed a conflict of interest (67.6% of
professionals and 52.4% of committee members).” Harner & Marincic, supra note 109, at 1172.
Conflicts arise because committee members harbor conflicting self-interest or consistently
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point, if the exchanges that occur in Chapter 11 restructurings are
imperfect or fundamentally anticompetitive, we can paraphrase a
question raised by Professor Allison with respect to rational actor
models of state policy decisions: to whose objectives does the
neoclassical paradigm refer? 335 Indeed, the Efficiency Fallacy, and
the Chapter 11 framework it supports, are undoubtedly called into
question.
In essence, even with its modern reliance on market
mechanisms, Chapter 11 still does not come any closer to achieving
“an idealized value of the bankrupt that . . . would arise if a perfect
market were at work,” 336 but rather draws upon principles of
“instrumental rationality” 337 to privilege the profit maximization
goals of powerful parties. The Efficiency Fallacy provides a
“calculation that makes plausible the character of the action chosen,”
drawing primarily upon the observer’s “reasoning,” or ability to
think through the restructuring problem. 338 In other words, the
Efficiency Fallacy endures, notwithstanding its shortcomings,
because it is intellectually convenient. It provides justification for
otherwise unjustifiable extractions of rents from, and assignments of
economic burdens to, constituents who are largely excluded from the
legal process. In light of the insights gained from decades of social
science and legal scholarship in the areas of corporate law and
bankruptcy, this antiquated and flawed paradigm cannot be
sustained. Certainly, it cannot be relied upon to guide modern
efforts to reform Chapter 11. A new explanatory model can generate
legal reforms that have the power to produce efficiency gains.
Of course, having argued that Chapter 11 is not necessarily a
competitive (and therefore efficient) legal mechanism, a deeper
question emerges: to what extent should Chapter 11 promote

promote the interests of a favored member over the objections of other members. See id. at
1172–73. These concerns are further explored in Michelle M. Harner, Committee Capture? An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV.
749 (2011).
334. Information asymmetries in corporate bankruptcies are explored in Harner, supra note
63. For instance, “Committee members . . . have access to and may use the corporation’s
confidential information to advance their own business agendas.” Id. at 474.
335. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 247.
336. Roe, supra note 34, at 530.
337. Instrumental rationality is explored in Owen M. Fiss, Reason in all its Splendor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990).
338. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 247.
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economic efficiency? To be sure, economic efficiency is an important
consideration because sound commercial restructuring procedures
facilitate the smooth operation of credit markets. However, even if
economic efficiency is the desired goal of law and policy, which
definition of efficiency ought to prevail? 339 Finally, to what extent
should economic efficiency concede to other important societal
goals, such as equity and fairness? The discourse on the normative
foundations of Chapter 11 (and corporate finance more broadly) is
still very much evolving in the wake of the recent financial crisis, and
a broader, interdisciplinary perspective is needed. By acknowledging
that the prevailing theoretical construct is not sufficiently complex to
address the nuances of modern restructurings, we move closer to
fully engaging these and other essential questions.

D. Opportunities for Legal Reform
Broadly speaking, the insights gained from the new explanatory
model reveal that deeper legal and structural changes are needed
before we can expect either consensus- or market-based processes to
yield efficient outcomes in Chapter 11 cases. There is likely a need
for an enhanced role of the judge in Chapter 11, to monitor
negotiations and conduct within firms, committees and other
organizational actors. The case studies suggest that internal
governance mechanisms do not necessarily create effective
clearinghouse functions that lead to efficient decision-making by
organizational actors. Although courts have traditionally directed
injured stakeholders to pursue their claims via expensive suits to
recover monetary damages, such recourse ignores the fact that
internal dynamics can have a direct influence on restructuring
outcomes. This is particularly true of the debtor’s internal dynamics,
because in most cases the debtor has the exclusive right to file a
Chapter 11 plan for a period of 120 days. 340
As one potential solution, bankruptcy courts could more readily
use their existing statutory powers to address problems that arise

339. Alternatives to the total welfare model include allocative efficiency and consumer
welfare models. See Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections
of an Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in JOSEF DREXL, ET. AL., ECONOMIC
THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 93 (2008).
340. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012).
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among the debtor’s constituents and its management. 341 In
particular, courts could utilize their investigative powers to ensure
that control of large organizational actors is obtained and exercised
in a legitimate and transparent manner. At a minimum, bankruptcy
rules should allow the court to routinely pierce the unitary actor
construct and should strive to expand the scope of persons with
standing to appear. Where it seems that the debtor is steered by
faithless fiduciaries or persons who are utilizing market power to
gain control of the restructuring, then the court might appoint a
trustee in a full or limited capacity to monitor the proceedings and
ensure that the goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy process are being
protected and promoted by the parties.342 In the same fashion, the
court might appoint an examiner to negotiate on the debtor’s behalf,
supervise the negotiations, assess potential causes of action or file a
Chapter 11 plan. 343 Alternatively, the court could more carefully
supervise or replace, where necessary, committees and other agents
that are entrusted with a fiduciary obligation to represent
constituent interests.
Similarly, legal reforms should focus upon ensuring greater
transparency and accountability, which are essential for the proper
functioning of market mechanisms. 344 As a starting place, reform
efforts should focus upon enhancing required disclosures of
organizational actors, with a particular emphasis on more fully
identifying their constituents’ actual economic interests. For
instance, Rule 2019 disclosure requirements were updated in 2011
to include disclosure of hedging transactions and other forms of
modern financial engineering, to the extent such transactions have
the potential to impact a person’s actual economic interest in
relation to the restructuring. 345 However, simultaneous

341. The court has such powers under 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
342. Kelli Alces explores the potential role of a trustee to address situations where the
debtor’s constituents are highly fractured and/or there are allegations of breaches of fiduciary
duties. Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83
(2007).
343. Bankruptcy courts are authorized to appoint examiners to carry out any duties of a
trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform. 11 U.S.C. § 1106.
344. IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES
AND CORPORATIONS? 29 (2010).
345. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a)(1) (reflecting 2011 amendments). This is a substantial
break from tradition, as derivative transactions typically slip through the cracks of most
disclosure requirements. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit

819

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/6/2014 1:43 PM

2013

amendments exclude from the rule’s coverage certain entities that
represent multiple creditors or equity security holders under formal
legal arrangements of trust or contract law. 346 This exclusion
bolsters the unitary actor model in the creditor context and also
allows certain participants in the bankruptcy proceeding to avoid the
expanded disclosure obligations that are imposed on other, direct
participants. Thus, in an effort to increase transparency, the more
expansive, proposed amendment to the rule ought to be
reconsidered. 347
Likewise, the practice of claims trading should be carefully
scrutinized, particularly given its potential to further privilege those
parties who are able to use their market power to “accumulate a
debtor’s unsecured debt to obtain a seat at the negotiating table.” 348
Such conduct can be detrimental: “Because the creditor is not
required to disclose its position, and because only select parties are
privy to the debtor’s restructuring negotiations, the creditor may be
able to leverage the process to its distinct advantage.” 349 In fact,
recent empirical research suggests a rising degree of influence by
single creditors or factions of dominant creditors in the restructuring
process. 350 As a result, “[T]he interests of junior stakeholders and
the company itself may be harmed.” 351 The case studies demonstrate
that claims trading can be utilized for strategic purposes by a variety
of participants in a Chapter 11 proceeding; and, when combined with
the practice of class gerrymandering, it allows persons with market
power to control the plan confirmation process. Specific reforms
might include increased disclosure requirements to identify new
ownership in claims and to identify each person’s actual economic
interest in acquired claims, 352 as well as limitations specifically
designed to curb insider trading violations and strategic acquisition
of majority stakes for plan confirmation purposes.

Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007).
346. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a)(1) (reflecting 2011 amendments).
347. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 96.
348. Harner & Marincic, supra note 109, at 1158–59.
349. Id. at 1159.
350. Id. at 1170.
351. Id. at 1159.
352. Proposals of this sort are considered in Joy Flowers Conti, Raymond F. Kozlowski, Jr.
& Leonard S. Ferleger, Claims Trafficking in Chapter 11— Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9
BANKR. DEV. J. 281 (1992).
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Of course, reform proposals of this sort have faced resistance in
the past. Courts and rule-makers have been sensitive to arguments
raised by industry groups representing hedge funds and other
sophisticated investors, who claim that burdensome disclosure
requirements will impair the functioning of the securities market by
revealing trading strategies and other confidential investor
information. 353 Similarly, rule-makers have heeded the warning that
limitations on claims trading will impair the market-based exit and
entry mechanisms that theoretically enable bankruptcy claims to
reach the highest value end-users.
In weighing these policy considerations, modern reformers
should consider that wherever persons with an interest in a Chapter
11 case are permitted to organize collectively and act as a group to
advance positions and gain a seat at the bargaining table, their
collective action confers benefits that privilege the interests of
certain stakeholders over those of other stakeholders who are not
able to effectively organize. These benefits might justify some degree
of burden, including heightened disclosure requirements or trading
limitations. In other words, the normative debate must acknowledge
that while it may be true that increased regulatory requirements in
commercial bankruptcy can lead to adverse market consequences,
there are also more immediate inefficiencies that can arise when
there are no checks on anticompetitive conduct. The key question for
reformers is not whether inefficiencies will arise, but rather who
should bear the cost of the inevitable inefficiencies.
A more dramatic overhaul of Chapter 11 may be necessary. The
inefficiencies examined in this Article seem likely to worsen in a
world where secured creditors often claim all of a debtor’s business
assets, 354 and where Chapter 11 is increasingly used to conduct
corporate liquidations 355 or “quasi-liquidations.” 356 In such a world,

353. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae SIFMA and LSTA in Support of Noteholder Group’s
Objection to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for Order Compelling Ad Hoc Committee to
Fully Comply with Rule 2019(a) by Filing Complete and Proper Verified Statement Disclosing
Its Membership and Their Interests at 2, In re Scotia Development, LLC, No. 07-20027 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007).
354. This new reality is eloquently described in Harvey R. Miller, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization Through the Looking Glass of 50 Years (1960-2010), 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 art. 1
(2010).
355. Business debtors increasingly conduct liquidations under Chapter 11 rather than
Chapter 7. See, e.g., H. Jason Gold & Dylan G. Trache, Liquidation of Troubled Businesses: Chapter 11
Liquidations Increasing, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 10 (2009); Michael Cooley, How to Succeed at
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commercial restructurings do not turn on the debtor’s future ability
to generate income to repay creditors, as Chapter 11 originally
contemplated. Rather, they often devolve into disputes over less
readily calculable and intangible assets, such as contracts and
pending litigation claims, or the future ability to utilize tax benefits,
such as net operating loss carryforwards. 357 As a result, the
restructuring process becomes even more political, with negotiations
focusing on the distribution of economic burdens, on one hand, and
the exploitation of rent-seeking opportunities, on the other. In
situations of this sort, the risk of self-dealing, conflicts of interest,
opportunism, information asymmetries and collective action
obstacles becomes even higher, as parties stand to gain substantial
advantages by aligning early in the process with the debtor and its
management or with powerful stakeholders who control the
debtor. 358
Thus, perhaps the present model, which relies upon and
facilitates the formation of coalitions to reach negotiated settlements
in Chapter 11 proceedings ought to be reconsidered. Similarly,
perhaps the debtor-in-possession model, which allows the distressed
company and its management to initially advance a Chapter 11
plan, 359 is not the most efficient model—particularly in cases such as
Washington Mutual, where the debtor bears little resemblance to the
business enterprise that prospered in better days. Rather, a trustee
or court-appointed chief restructuring officer might better serve
these essential functions. Similarly, reliance on committees
composed of the largest claim holders to advance claimants’ interests
may no longer be appropriate in a world where sophisticated persons
routinely hedge large investments, and where distressed debt
investors trade in the debtor’s securities throughout the pendency of

Chapter 11 Without Really Reorganizing,

J. OF CORP. RENEWAL (Aug. 27, 2008),
http:www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=9654; Stephen J. Lubben,
Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2007); see also 9C Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy §2818; BEN
BRANCH ET AL., LAST RIGHTS: LIQUIDATING A COMPANY (2007).
356. In a so-called quasi-liquidation, the debtor liquidates its operating subsidiary and
reorganizes the corporate parent—typically to preserve the future benefit of valuable tax
attributes. See The Solyndra Memorial Tax Break, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444799904578050803545600588.html.
357. See id. Loss carryforwards are determined under 26 U.S.C. § 172.
358. These early alliances enable stakeholders to influence the Chapter 11 plan during the
debtor’s exclusivity period. See supra note 340 and source cited therein.
359. See supra note 340 and source cited therein.

822

DO NOT DELETE

759

2/6/2014 1:43 PM

The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy

the case. It might better serve the goals of bankruptcy if parties
advocated separately for their own interests.
Finally, while market-based processes may in theory offer the
potential for increased participation in the restructuring by a broader
range of constituents, they take place within a legal framework that
grants structural privileges to certain parties. Accordingly, they are
susceptible to the same problems that early critics of Chapter 11
identified, and in fact they can provide a ready mechanism for parties
to use their market power to gain more opportunities to crowd out
dissent to their desired restructuring outcome. Thus,
notwithstanding increasing integration of market mechanisms,
negotiations by parties to Chapter 11 cases must be carefully
monitored to ensure that they do not enhance market inequalities
and enable the exercise of market power.
To be sure, reforms of this sort would in many cases add to the
existing litigation burdens of the bankruptcy process. However, the
distributional and burden-assigning effects of Chapter 11 must be
recognized, in addition to its inherent inefficiencies. As reform
efforts take shape, protective rules and policies should be considered
to allow meaningful participation in Chapter 11 restructurings by
persons other than dominant parties with market power. Moreover,
given bankruptcy law’s historic deference to efficiency goals, Chapter
11 must be carefully assessed to ensure that it does not “permit[]
private actors with powerful economic interests to pursue selfinterest free of community norms.” 360 Of course, in the wake of the
recent financial crisis, the law of corporate financial distress is
simply one component of a much larger space that demands careful
attention from scholars and reformers.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Owen Fiss observed, “To say . . . that ‘law is
efficiency,’ implicitly hypothesizes a single, uncontested end and
relegates the judge to formulating rules—the instruments—that best
serve that end.” 361 Chapter 11 rests upon a neoclassical economic
paradigm that promises efficient outcomes to the extent market
360. Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 n.33
(1985).
361. Fiss, supra note 337, at 792.
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mechanisms are utilized. Through its reliance on outmoded and
facile theoretical assumptions, Chapter 11 relegates not judges, but
certain privileged parties to formulating the instruments that best
serve their own profit maximization goals. But when more
comprehensive narratives of corporate financial distress are told, the
extant legal process reveals itself to be anything but economically
efficient.
In reality, the structural limitations of Chapter 11 produce
distortions that cause even the most sensibly designed market
mechanisms to yield inefficient case outcomes. By obscuring these
inefficiencies, the legal construct achieves a largely unquestioned
distributional effect, privileging certain actors and enabling them to
dominate restructuring outcomes and extract rents. In light of the
distributional functions achieved by Chapter 11, constituents are
routinely forced to bear economic burdens even though they have
been effectively barred from the legal process. To this end, it is
difficult to argue—particularly in the wake of the Great Recession—
that the restructuring process offered by Chapter 11 advances overall
societal welfare by any measure.
Once the Efficiency Fallacy is exposed and set aside, we are left
with tremendous opportunities for law reform. And there is much
work to be done. As other scholars have observed, the commercial
restructuring process needs to be more inclusive and transparent, 362
and efforts to reform Chapter 11 are underway. A new explanatory
model, drawing on the analytical tools of modern political economy,
allows an expanded narrative of corporate financial distress. The
stories that emerge might pave the way for an overhauled legal
construct that achieves more efficient restructurings. More
importantly, these stories permit acknowledgment of—and thus an
opportunity to ameliorate—the inequitable distributional effects that
worsen financial distress and ultimately undercut economic progress.

362. “Encouraging more parties to participate may enhance that dialogue by introducing
additional and potentially different perspectives on value creation. The challenge is preserving a
relatively level and fair playing field among the stakeholders so that all voices are heard.” Harner
& Marincic, supra note 109, at 1182.
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